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PURPOSE VS. POWER: PARENSPATRIAE AND 
AGENCY SELF-INTEREST 
Daniel L. Hatcher* 
INTRODUCTION 
"They're my advocates? No they're not. To me, they're against 
me.,,1 
Agencies that exist to serve also seek to exist. The purpose of state 
human service agencies to serve vulnerable populations such as abused 
and neglected children derives from the common law doctrine of parens 
patriae, embodying the inherent role of the state as parent of the coun-
try.2 The doctrine provides the foundation for the very existence of agen-
cies that serve vulnerable children and underlies the core purpose of the 
agencies to promote and protect children's welfare and best interests.3 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore; J.D. 1996, University 
of Virginia School of Law. I would like to thank Michele E. Gilman, Caterina 
Hatcher, and participants in the Masking and Manipulating Vulnerability, A 
Vulnerability and Human Condition Initiative & Feminism and Legal Theory Project 
Workshop at Emory University School of Law, for the helpful suggestions on earlier 
drafts of this article. This article was supported by a summer research stipend from 
the University of Baltimore School of Law. 
1. In re Ryan, No. 802023006, at 3 (Bait. City Cir. Ct. June 16, 2011) (q uoting a 
teenage foster child regarding the child welfare agency's diversion of his Social Secur-
ity survivor benefits to agency funds) (on file with author). 
2. See Dwight R. Carswell, Comment, CAFA and Parens Patriae Actions, 78 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 345, 347 (2011); Vivian Hamilton, Principles of u.s. Family Law, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 34 n.l0 (2006); Kristin Henning, Loyalty, Paternalism, and 
Rights: Client Counseling Theory and the Role of Child's Counsel in Delinquency 
Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 297 (2005). 
3. See, e.g., Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reap-
praisal of the State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 896-910 
(1975) (providing historical progression of the parens patriae doctrine); Naomi Cahn, 
State Representation of Children's Interests, 40 F AM. L.Q. 109, 112-13 (2006); Tanya 
M. Washington, Throwing Black Babies Out with the Bathwater: A Child-Centered 
Challenge to Same-Sex Adoption Bans, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 1, 30 
(2009) (stating a "child's best interests provide the sole justification for the state's 
exercise of its parens patriae authority"). In addition to providing states with authority 
to protect vulnerable children, the parens patriae doctrine also is invoked to provide 
states with authority to sue on behalf of their citizens-often in cases involving envi-
ronmental concerns or other rights under federal law. E.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Feder-
alism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1,63-64 (2011); Robert A. 
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Yet along with this foundational purpose, the parens patriae doctrine also 
provides power that is often illusive to public knowledge and oversight.4 
The agencies exist as guardians, with their interests assumed as both 
synonymous and intertwined with those of the children entrusted to their 
care. The agency power exists within societal expectations and assump-
tions of purity of agency purpose, allowing for agency actions that often 
go unquestioned and hidden from public consideration.5 
To maintain their cloak of power, the very agencies created to fulfill 
the parens patriae obligations-to protect the rights of children-have 
systematically battled the children's efforts to claim those rights as their 
own. As foster children have struggled to enforce their state statutory 
rights, federal statutory rights, and constitutional rights, child welfare 
agencies have sought to block the children's efforts at every step.6 
Also, the agencies created to protect the interests of children have 
now come to view their child beneficiaries as a source of revenue. As the 
agencies continue to face bleak budget outlooks, anti-tax sentiment, and 
the desire to cut state spending,7 revenue maximization strategies have 
led to conflicts between the obligation to serve the interests of children 
Weinstock, Note, The Lorax State: Parens Patriae and the Provision of Public Goods, 
109 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 806-16 (2009). 
4. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) ("The Latin phrase [parens patriae] 
proved to be a great help to those who sought to rationalize the exclusion of juveniles 
from the constitutional scheme .... "). 
5. See generally Emily Bazelon, Note, Public Access to Juvenile and Family 
Court: Should the Courtroom Doors Be Open or Closed?, 18 YALE L. & POL'y REV. 
155 (1999); Kathleen S. Bean, Changing the Rules: Public Access to Dependency 
Court, 79 DENY. U. L. REV. 1 (2001); Matthew 1. Fraidin, Stories Told and Untold: 
Confidentiality Laws and the Master Narrative of Child Welfare, 63 ME. L. REV. 1 
(2010). 
6. For a discussion of the historical progression of children seeking to enforce 
their rights against state agency opposition, see generally Barbara L. Atwell, "A Lost 
Generation": The Battle for Private Enforcement of the Adoption Assistance and Child 
Welfare Act of 1980,60 U. CrN. L. REV. 593 (1992); Cristina Chi-Young Chou, Re-
newing the Good Intentions of Foster Care: Enforcement of the Adoption Assistance 
and Child Welfare Act of 1980 and the Substantive Due Process Right to Safety, 46 
V AND. L. REV. 683 (1993); Sara J. Klein, Note, Protecting the Rights of Foster Chil-
dren: Suing Under § 1983 to Enforce Federal Child Welfare Law, 26 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2611 (2005). 
7. Jon Donenberg, Medicaid and Beneficiary Enforcement: Maintaining State 
Compliance with Federal A vailability Requirements, 117 YALE L.J. 1498, 1516 & n.100 
(2008) (explaining that "Medicaid and other social programs are the first in line for 
cuts in cash-strapped states desperate for revenue," quoting, Letter from Sen. Bar-
bara A. Mikulski et aI., to Sen. Max Baucus, Chairman, S. Fin. Comm. and Sen. 
Charles Grassley, Ranking Member, S. Fin. Comm. (Jan. 29, 2008)). 
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and the fiscal interests of agency self-preservation and growth.s Consider-
ing just one of the agency practices of treating children as a revenue 
source, foster care agencies across the country are taking over a quarter 
of a billion dollars each year from foster children in their care.9 The agen-
cies do so, often under the direction of private consultants working for a 
contingency fee, by targeting children who are disabled or have deceased 
or disabled parents and taking the children's Social Security benefits to 
replenish the state coffers.lO This raw pursuit of money-even when taken 
from the children in agency care-is asserted to be in the greater good of 
all children served. 11 
The agencies are using their power to take resources from the vul-
nerable populations they exist to serve, under the rationale of increasing 
the agencies' capacity to serve the same vulnerable populations. How-
ever, as agencies take funds from children and the poor, states and pri-
vate industry in turn take those funds from the agencies to bolster private 
profits and state general revenue. 12 As a result, the additional federal 
funds resulting from revenue maximization contracts may not lead to ad-
ditional fiscal capacity for the human service agencies, but rather through 
fiscal maneuvers states often divert funds into their general revenues. 13 
The conflict of interest between agency purpose and fiscal self-inter-
ests is further complicated on multiple relationship levels: through the 
fiscal federalism relationship of the state governments with the federal 
government, the relationship of the state agencies with their private con-
tractors, and the relationship of the state agencies with their parent states. 
First, the conflict between agency purpose and agency self-interest exists 
within a structure of fiscal federalism-an intended partnership of 
8. See Daniel L. Hatcher, Foster Children Paying for Foster Care, 27 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1797, 1799 (2006). 
9. ADRIENNE L. FERNANDES-ALCANTARA ET AL., CONGo RESEARCH SERV., 
RL 33855, CHILD WELFARE: SOCIAL SECURITY AND SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY IN-
COME (SSI) BENEFITS FOR CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 16 (Apr. 27, 2011), available at 
http://assets.opencrs.comirpts/RL33855 _20110427 .pdf. 
10. See id. at 1830-32. 
11. Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Kef-
feler, 537 U.S. 371, 390-91 (2003) (noting arguments of amici that if state foster care 
agencies were no longer allowed to take foster children's Social Security benefits, the 
agencies would stop acting as payees, stop screening children for possible eligibility 
for Social Security benefits, and less total funds would be available to meet foster 
children's needs). 
12. Daniel L. Hatcher, Poverty Revenue: The Subversion of Fiscal Federalism, 52 
ARIZ. L. REV. 675, 701-708 (2010). 
13. ld. 
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strengths between the federal and state governments. 14 But as the state 
agencies seek to benefit from the fiscal strength of the federal govern-
ment, their own strengths in addressing the local and individualized needs 
of their beneficiaries gives way to their self-interested revenue strate-
gies.1s Second, as a catalyst to the conflict, a vast poverty industry has 
grown around the fiscal federalism structure-capitalizing on the billions 
in grant-in-aid (federal aid) dollars flowing to the states by providing op-
erational and consulting services for poverty programs and encouraging 
state strategies to increase claims of the federal funds. 16 Third, agencies 
exist as arms of the states and thus are subject to state control. The parens 
patriae power that is housed within state human services agencies, already 
diverted toward agency self-interest, is often further manipulated by the 
broader state powers and interests-with the states aiming to control 
their agency parts in order to serve themselves. 17 
This article will unravel the intertwined conflict between parens pa-
triae purpose and power, as well as peel back and explore the layers of 
complication within the conflict. Part I will put the conflict between 
parens patriae purpose and power in its historical, theoretical, and practi-
cal context. Part II exposes the details of self-interested fiscal pursuits of 
human services agencies, to the detriment of those served. Litigation cur-
rently on appeal in Maryland will provide stark illustration as a frame-
work to the discussion. Part III explains the additional layers of 
interrelationships between the agencies and the federal government, the 
poverty industry, and their parent states that both heighten and further 
complicate the conflict. This article concludes with recommendations to 
restore purity to parens patriae, both in theory and in agency application. 
1. PARENS PATRIAE UNRAVELED 
The foundational structure and conflict within agency purpose and 
power in the context of human service agencies serving abused and ne-
glected children stems from the historical roots of the parens patriae doc-
14. See WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM (1972); I1ya Somin, Closing 
the Pandora's Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial Restriction of Federal Subsi-
dies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461 (2002); David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal 
Federalism, 118 HARv. L. REV. 2544 (2005); Hatcher, supra note 12, at 683-85 (ex-
plaining that fiscal federalism is an economic theory suggesting a structure for govern-
ment programs through a partnership between the federal government's financial 
power and the state government's strengths in serving localized needs, and is the basis 
for our nation's largest federal aid programs). 
15. See generally Hatcher, supra note 12. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
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trine. This article examines the power in terms of confidentiality and the 
lack of due process, as well as how agencies seek to use their power to 
subvert the very rights of those the agencies exist to serve. 
A. Historical Purpose 
The parens patriae doctrine is rooted in unfortunate beginnings. This 
section describes the emergence and misuse of the doctrine in feudal En-
gland, and traces the doctrine's evolution to America-where, although 
more benign in intent, the doctrine has been diverted again toward the 
financial self-interests of states and their human service agencies. 
1. Common Law Roots: Aid to the Unfortunate and Riches for the 
Crown 
The state's power and responsibility to protect the well-being of vul-
nerable children and adults is historically rooted in the parens patriae 
doctrine, dating back to feudal England. 1s The doctrine was conflicted 
from the beginning, pitting the pure aim of aiding those in need of care 
against the self-interested fiscal motive of obtaining riches to sustain the 
crown. 19 
Part of the history of the parens patriae doctrine was benevolent, 
such as when the king provided assistance and protection to citizens who 
could not do so for themselves. The doctrine stemmed from the king's 
royal prerogative of "establish[ing] the king as a protector or supreme 
guardian of those classes threatened by forces beyond their control. ,,20 
Regarding "idiots and lunatics," the king provided assistance without fis-
cal motives: "[W]e can conclude that in the seventeenth century the 
king's relation to idiots and lunatics was that of guardian to ward, that the 
guardianship was a duty of care rather than a source of profit.,,21 
However, regarding children, actions of the crown under the parens 
patriae doctrine were lacking in benevolent motive.22 Protection under 
the doctrine was not applied to all children, but rather focused on chil-
dren of the landed gentry with estates that could provide riches to the 
18. See generally John Seymour, Parens Patriae and Wardship Powers: Their Na-
ture and Origins, 14 OXFORD J. LEGAL STlJD. 159 (1994). 
19. See Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 
EMORY L.J. 195, 196-99 (1978). 
20. George B. Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as Par-
ent or Tyrant?, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 895, 896-97 (1976). 
21. Neil Howard Cogan, Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of "Parens 
Patriae," 22 S.C. L. REV. 147, 161 (1970). 
22. Curtis, supra note 20, at 897-98; Custer, supra note 19, at 196. 
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crown.23 This type of wardship was founded not upon the king's interests 
in protecting the vulnerable, but in the feudal tenurial system, and the 
focus on fiscal interests led to abusive practices.24 Under this early ward-
ship system, the guardians-usually a lord, or the king directly-had 
rights rather than duties with regard to the male and female heirs,25 and 
such rights were abused: 
In the case of wards of the crown, it was the practice of the Court 
of Wards and Liveries to sell both the wardship and marriage 
rights, and that these wardships went as often to strangers as to 
mothers or families of minor heirs indicates that this type of ward-
ship was administered with a financial rather than a humanitarian 
motive. The historical record itself suggests that the Court of 
Wards and Liveries was in fact established with the express pur-
pose of increasing revenue from sales of wardships, and that reac-
tion to abuses in this context led to the eventual abolition of the 
court, if not the wardship institution itself.26 
2. Parens Patriae in America 
As the doctrine began to appear in American jurisprudence, it pro-
vided not merely authority but a duty to the vulnerable-with a humani-
tarian and benign aimY Although the treatment of children in early 
American history was certainly lacking, the parens patriae doctrine was 
quickly established as providing the foundational authority and duty of 
states to serve and protect the best interests of children.28 However, while 
the duty to protect and serve the welfare of children became clear, ac-
tions taken by state agencies and juvenile courts became clouded within 
confidential court and agency systems and by an absence of due process.29 
As the doctrine developed, along with the early failings of the child 
welfare system and juvenile courts, children finally found their own rec-
ognition as persons under the U.S. Constitution.30 In finding children 
23. Curtis, supra note 20, at 897-98. 
24. Custer, supra note 19, at 196 ("It was this type of wardship that was most 
profitable for the crown and therefore most notorious for its financial abuses."). 
25. See Gilbert T. Venable, The Parens Patriae Theory and Its Effect on the Con-
stitutional Limits of Juvenile Court Powers, 27 U. PITT. L. REV. 894 (1966). 
26. Custer, supra note 19, at 199. 
27. Id. at 207. 
28. E.g., In re Knowack, 53 N.E. 676, 677 (N.Y. 1899) ("The state, as parens 
patriae, by this legislation seeks to protect children who are destitute and abandoned 
by those whose duty it is to care for and support them."). 
29. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967); see generally Fraidin, supra note 5. 
30. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 16. 
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have due process rights, Justice Fortas's opinion in In re Gault noted the 
dubious history of the parens patriae doctrine: "The Latin phrase [parens 
patriae] proved to be a great help to those who sought to rationalize the 
exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its meaning is 
murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance.,,31 
The recognition of children's due process rights led to numerous 
cases finding children have enforceable rights and that states have a duty 
to act only in the best interests of children in order to protect and serve 
their welfareY But even as the doctrine's benevolent focus has grown in 
alongside an increased recognition of children's independent rights, the 
child welfare system has continued to operate largely in the dark. Juve-
nile courts often still enforce a strict confidentiality over proceedings,33 
and state agency actions and procedures are often even more hidden 
from public view.34 Children's due process rights, even after Gault, con-
tinue to be shortchanged. 
B. Cloak of Power 
As the parens patriae doctrine has continued to evolve, moving for-
ward under jurisprudence that has established the intended obligation to 
31. Id. 
32. See, e.g., L.J. v. Wilbon, 633 F.3d 297, 307-10 (4th Cir. 2011) (holding that 
the Maryland foster care agency failed to establish that there was no private right of 
action of foster children to enforce federal requirements to provide individualized 
foster care case plans or a case review system); Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 771 
F. Supp. 2d 142, 169-72 (D. Mass. 2011) (children have an enforceable right in the 
state making foster care payments); C.H. v. Payne, 683 F. Supp. 2d 865, 877 (S.D. Ind. 
2010); see also Everett Skillman, The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act and 
the Minor's Civil Rights Remedies, 14 TRINITY LAW REV. 1, 13-14 & n.44 (2007) (not-
ing some decisions that have found provisions under federal child welfare laws to be 
enforceable under 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (2006) ) (citing Kenny A. ex rel. Winn v. Perdue, 
218 F.R.D. 277, 292 (N.D. Ga. 2003)), Brian A. ex rel. Brooks v. Sundquist, 149 F. 
Supp. 2d 941, 949 (M.D. Tenn. 2000), Marisol A. ex reZ. Forbes v. Giuliani, 929 F. 
Supp. 662, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), afl'd, 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997), Jeanine B. ex rel. 
Blondis v. Thompson, 877 F. Supp. 1268, 1283-85 (E.D. Wis. 1995)). 
33. See Fraidin, supra note 5, at 2. 
34. Id.; see also Nora Meltzer, Dismissing the Foster Children: The Eleventh Cir-
cuit's Misapplication and Improper Expansion of the Younger Abstention Doctrine in 
Bonnie L. v. Bush, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 635, 672 (2005) (noting that "every state has 
legislation that makes foster care records confidential[,]" and that "[ a]lthough the 
purpose underlying these confidentiality laws is protection of the child's privacy, the 
laws allow foster care agencies to evade accountability for their actions."); Abbey M. 
Marzick, Note, The Foster Care Ombudsman: Applying an International Concept to 
Help Prevent Institutional Abuse of America's Foster Youth, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 506, 
508 (2007) ("Because all states have laws that keep foster care records confidential, 
foster care agencies are shielded from the public watch."). 
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serve and protect the welfare and rights of children, the state agencies 
created to protect children's interests continue to look back toward feu-
dal England, when children were considered property and a source of 
funds. 35 Child welfare agencies have often sought to hide their actions 
from public view, fought to diminish children's rights, and maneuvered to 
place their own agency fiscal self-interest over the interests of the chil-
dren they serve. This section describes the cloud in which agencies can act 
in confidentiality, the shortchanged due process rights provided to chil-
dren, and agencies' efforts to subvert children's struggles to claim their 
rights as their own-all creating a cloak of power which allows the agency 
self-interested actions described in Part II. 
1. Confidentiality and Societal Assumptions 
Although children have been recognized as persons under the Con-
stitution since Justice Fortas's opinion in 1967/6 their rights-and protec-
tions-have not flourished. 37 In the words of appellate court judges, 
children's rights have grown stronger.38 But children in state care still live 
in a dark world. Juvenile court proceedings are often either kept com-
35. See generally Curtis, supra note 20; Custer, supra note 19; Venable, supra 
note 25. 
36. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). 
37. See generally Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children's Rights?, 80 
MINN. L. REV. 267 (1996); see also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, HIDDEN IN PLAIN 
SIGHT: THE TRAGEDY OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS FROM BEN FRANKLIN TO LIONEL 
TATE (2008). 
38. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13; Norfleet ex rei. Norfleet v. Ark. Dep't of 
Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 293 (8th CiT. 1993) (stating that foster children have a 
constitutional right to "adequate medical care, protection and supervision"); Meador 
v. Cabinet for Human Res., 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th CiT. 1990) (holding that a foster 
child's due process rights extend to "the right to be free from the infliction of unnec-
essary harm to children in state-regulated foster homes"); Brian A. ex rei. Brooks v. 
Sundquist, 149 F. Supp. 2d 941, 953 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (recognizing the right of a 
foster child "to be placed in the least restrictive, most appropriate, family-like setting 
while in state custody," and to "receive care, treatment and services consistent with 
accepted, reasonable professional judgment"); Charlie H. v. Whitman, 83 F. Supp. 2d 
476, 507 (D. N.J. 2000) (holding that foster children have a liberty interest "to the 
right to treatment, which includes the right to receive care, treatment and services 
consistent with competent professional judgment .... "); Marisol A. ex rei. Forbes v. 
Giuliani, 929 F. Supp. 662, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that foster children have a 
constitutional right to protection from harm by the state); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. 
Supp. 1387, 1396 (N.D. III. 1989) (holding foster children have constitutional right "to 
be free from unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions on both [their] physical and 
emotional well-being"). 
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pletely or partially confidential,39 and only a small percentage of the hun-
dreds of thousands of cases make it out to see the light of day through 
appeals. The vast majority of cases are heard in shockingly overcrowded 
court dockets before judges or masters who may struggle to fight back the 
overwhelming apathy of helplessness. 4o Most of what occurs in these court 
rooms, which are all too often still the "kangaroo" courts cautioned 
against by Justice Fortas, is never known beyond the courtroom walls.41 
What is hidden in the courts is even more lost from public view in 
the purposefully and recklessly developed bureaucratic fog that shields 
child welfare agencies' actions and policies.42 Even in those states where 
39. See Fraidin, supra note 5, at 30-33; see generally Kathleen S. Bean, Changing 
the Rules: Public Access to Dependency Court, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
40. See Bernardine Dohrn, Seize the Little Moment: Justice for the Child 20 
Years at the Children and Family Justice Center, 6 Nw. J. L. & Soc. POL'y 334, 334 
(2011). Professor Dohrn describes the state of a Chicago juvenile court as follows: 
Sadly, the Juvenile Court of Cook County-the world's first court for children 
and a global inspiration-was high in the abysmal category. Set in Chicago's 
Near West Side, the juvenile courts and detention center (known colloquially 
as the Audy Home) were filthy, overcrowded, secretive, a haven for burnt-out 
judges, unaccountable, without published data, and a magnet for impover-
ished families and youngsters of color, primarily African-American children. 
Crowds of anxious parents and children were made to throng in the hallways, 
doors and toilet paper were missing in the bathrooms, public officials-
judges, defenders and prosecutors, probation officers and court clerks-
seemed not to look up as multitudes of accused were called forth and 
adjudged. 
Td.; see also, Marcia Robinson Lowry & Sara Bartosz, Why Children Still Need a Law-
yer, 41 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 199, 207 (2007) ("The periodic family court case re-
views included in the federal statutory scheme as a safeguard for children have been 
emasculated by a lack of adequate representation for children and, in many states, by 
an inadequately staffed juvenile court system."); Martin Guggenheim, Somebody's 
Children: Sustaining the Family's Place in Child Welfare Policy, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
1716, 1716 (2000) (reviewing ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY's CHILDREN: ABUSE 
AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE (1999), and stating 
that "[v]irtually everyone familiar with current child welfare practice in the United 
States agrees that it is in crisis."); Solomon J. Greene, Vicious Streets: The Crisis of the 
Industrial City and the Invention of Juvenile Justice, 15 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 135, 166 
(2003) (explaining how "juvenile courts have become increasingly discredited and bu-
reaucratic under the weight of burgeoning dockets .... "). 
41. See Tn re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,28 (1967); Dohrn, supra note 40 at 334; see also 
Fraidin, supra note 5, at 30-33; Bazelon, supra note 5, at 155; Bean, supra note 5, at 1. 
42. See Nora Meltzer, Dismissing the Foster Children: The Eleventh Circuit's 
Misapplication and Improper Expansion of the Younger Abstention Doctrine in Bon-
nie L. v. Bush, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 635, 672 (2005) (explaining that "every state has 
legislation that makes foster care records confidential[]" and that "[a]lthough the 
purpose underlying these confidentiality laws is protection of the child's privacy, the 
laws allow foster care agencies to evade accountability for their actions"). 
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juvenile court proceedings are not closed to the public, agency records 
are generally kept confidential, assuming the agency actions are even 
documented in some form at al1. 43 Also, despite the rulemaking require-
ments of state administrative procedures acts, much of the detail of 
agency policy and practices is set out in more informal agency direc-
tives-such as action transmittals and policy manuals-that are not devel-
oped through a formal rule making process.44 
Child welfare agencies fight against disclosure of agency records and 
practices, under the assertion of protecting the confidentiality of children 
in their care.45 Then, within the confidential structure, the agencies seek 
unfettered discretion, claiming such unquestioned and unexposed circum-
stances allow the agencies to do their best work on the children's be-
half-claiming judicial interference with agency discretion would violate 
the doctrines of sovereign immunity and separation of powers.46 The level 
to which some child welfare agencies are averse to any review of their 
discretion is evident in a brief by the Georgia Department of Human 
Resources: 
As long as a child is in the legal custody of the Department, place-
ment decisions regarding that child are solely within the purview 
of the Department .... When a deprived child is placed in the 
Department's temporary legal custody by a juvenile court, the De-
partment "has the right to physical custody of the child, the right 
to determine the nature of the care and treatment of the child, 
including ordinary medical care, and the right and duty to provide 
for the care, protection, training, and education and the physical, 
43. Id. 
44. See Daniel L. Hatcher, Foster Children Paying for Foster Care, 27 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1797, 1802 n.19 (2006) (noting how "[i]n North Carolina, the state policy 
manual directs local offices and staff that '[t]he county DSS must be aware of all 
resources available to a child, which may include a child's unearned income from 
sources such as Supplemental Security Income, Social Security Survivor's benefits, 
trust funds, endowments, or child support paid directly to the agency.'" (quoting N.C. 
Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Div. of Soc. Servs. Manual)). 
45. See, e.g., Hanson v. Rowe, 500 P.2d 916, 918 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (stating 
that in an action by a parent against the state due to the death of a child and personal 
injuries of another child in foster care, the state agency fought against the disclosure 
of agency records, contending that "disclosure should be granted only under circum-
stances which would possibly assist in the protection, welfare or treatment of the chil-
dren or their families"). 
46. See, e.g., Brief for Appellant Georgia Department of Human Resources at 
23-26; In re A.V.B. A Minor Child, 482 S.E.2d 275 (Ga. 1996) (No. S96G1697); see 
generally Bruce A. Boyer, Jurisdictional Conflicts Between Juvenile Courts and Child 
Welfare Agencies: The Uneasy Relationship Between Institutional Co-Parents, 54 MD. 
L. REV. 377 (1995). 
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mental, and moral welfare of the child, subject to the conditions 
and limitations of the order and to the remaining rights and duties 
of the child's parents or guardian." 
Yet, the Court of Appeals' decision in the instant case ignores the 
express authority referenced above and now permits juvenile 
courts to render decisions regarding placement of children in the 
Department's custody, decisions which heretofore were deemed 
to be solely within the province of the Department .... The net 
effect of this portion of the Court of Appeals' decision in this case 
permits any party which might disagree with placement decisions 
made by the Department to have those decisions re-evaluated by 
the courts, thereby allowing the courts to assume the role of a 
"super placement agency" and thus abrogate the State's sovereign 
immunity. Such a role is not only improper for the courts, but also 
is violative of both the doctrines of sovereign immunity and sepa-
ration of powers inherent in Georgia's Constitution .... 47 
169 
For much of the public, the assumption is that child welfare agencies 
are generally pure in their pursuit of children's best interests. We want to 
believe that a child welfare agency will strictly serve the welfare of chil-
dren and put any conflicting interests aside. Although public outcry can 
be sparked after a horrific event, such as a child's death after ineffective 
agency assistance, the agency response is often simply a knee-jerk reac-
tion of removing more children from their families when there is any per-
ceived risk-while simultaneously trying to shut the door even more to 
public awareness of the agency inner-workings.48 
2. Children's Rights in Darkness 
Constitutional due process for children is weak because of the confi-
dential systems used in agencies and juvenile and dependency courts. 
Within the confidential system of agencies serving children and juvenile 
and dependency courts, constitutional due process protections are weak. 
Appellate courts have been torn in determining the amount of due pro-
cess protections necessary in matters involving children.49 Even when 
courts have recognized due process protections for children, in practice 
they are often ignored by the overwhelmed juvenile court system.50 As 
47. See Brief for Appellant Georgia Department of Human Resources, supra 
note 46, at 23-26. 
48. See Fraidin, supra note 5, at 8-16, 40-43. 
49. See generally Mark R. Fondacaro et aI., Reconceptualizing Due Process in 
Juvenile Justice: Contributions from Law and Social Science, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 955, 
958-67 (2006). 
50. See Dohrn, supra note 40, at 334; see also Fraidin, supra note 5, at 30-33; 
Bazelon, supra note 5, at 155; Bean, supra note 5, at 1. For purposes of simplicity, the 
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children struggle to preserve or establish their own rights to increased 
constitutional protections or enforceable rights under statutes drawn up 
to protect their interests, child welfare agencies fight even harder to un-
dermine the children's effortsY 
a. Due Process Lite 
In In re Gault, Justice Fortas described historical concerns of how 
overreliance on the parens patriae powers can lead to the denial of due 
process for childrenY Before Gault, the state agencies and courts often 
provided children in child welfare proceedings with minimal, if any, due 
process rights, rationalizing the deprivation of rights under the theory 
that the state and courts were acting in a protective function.53 Gault pro-
vided a notable step toward stopping the misuse of the parens patriae 
doctrine that long deprived children of rights, and the decision recognized 
children's rightful place under the Constitution.54 
However, the revolution of children's due process rights has fallen 
short, because of the child welfare system's history of taking actions 
against children's rights.55 Although Gault provided children with the 
right to counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings, the right to counsel 
has unfortunately not yet been fully afforded to children in child protec-
tion proceedings.56 
dependency courts that address abuse and neglect proceedings and courts that ad-
dress juvenile delinquency proceedings are often simply referred to as juvenile courts 
in this article. 
51. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. 
52. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967). 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 13. 
55. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Courage of Innocence: Children as Heroes 
in the Struggle for Justice, 2009 U. III. L. REV. 1567, 1577-78 (2009). The author 
stated, 
To date, the u.s. Supreme Court has given limited recognition to children's 
civil rights and civil liberties .... Historically, children were objects and not 
subjects of law, functioning more in the role of parental property than as per-
sons. They were rarely seen as bearers of due process and equal protection 
right .... But Brown v. Board of Education, recognizing children's rights to 
equality of education, and In re Gault, recognizing children's rights in juvenile 
courts, began to change the legal landscape. As the Court stated in Gault, 
"[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults 
alone." This promising bit of dicta has never fully matured. To date, most of 
the constitutional rights accorded to children have been rights of protection 
against state action as opposed to rights of active participation. !d. (alteration 
in original) (footnote omitted). 
56. See AMY HARFELD, CHRISTINA RIEHL & ELISA WEICHEL, A CHILD'S 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR 
ABUSED & NEGLECTED CHILDREN (2d ed. 2009), available at http://www.firststar.org/ 
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As the growth of due process rights of children has stagnated, the 
application of those rights that have in fact been recognized is often trun-
cated at best.57 Judges overwhelmed with large caseloads, and jaded by 
years of exposure to the chaos and helplessness of the child welfare sys-
tem, often go through the motions of civil procedure and due process, 
and sometimes barely SO.58 Much of the leg work might be shuffled down 
to judicial masters-whose dockets are sometimes even larger than the 
judges'-who then often retreat to focusing on forcing settlements rather 
than seeking to uncover the necessary details to determine the best inter-
ests of the children. If children do have a lawyer, they often meet them 
for the first time in court because of the lawyer's crushing case load. 
Moreover, children may still not have a voice if the lawyer decides to 
interject his or her own view as to what is the best for the child rather 
than representing the child as the client.59 The result is a system that is 
chaotic and lacks due process, which allows for children's rights to be 
both overlooked and subverted. 
b. Guardians Subverting the Rights of their Wards 
State child welfare agencies exist to protect the interests, and the 
rights, of abused and neglected children.60 Courts have long recognized 
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket= TRMFoSlkfFI%3d&tabid=74; Erik Pitchal, Children's 
Constitutional Right to Counsel in Dependency Cases, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. 
REV. 663, 665-66 (2006); see also Martin Guggenheim, The Right to Be Represented 
but Not Heard: Reflections on Legal Representation for Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
76,133-34 (1984) (explaining doubts about whether children have right to counsel in 
foster care proceedings). 
57. As Professor Barbara Woodhouse explains, "[l]awyers and judges often dis-
miss or overlook children's due process concerns in civil cases, because the law has for 
so long been accustomed to treating children as parental property, lacking not only 
'capacity' but personhood." BARBARA WOODHOUSE, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, IN YOUTH 
AND JUSTICE (Susan O. White ed., 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/ 
papers.cfm?abstracUd=234180. 
58. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
59. See generally Annette Ruth Appell, Representing Children Representing 
What?: Critical Reflections on Lawyering for Children, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
573 (2008); Barbara Glesner Fines, Pressures Toward Mediocrity in the Representation 
of Children, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 411 (2008); Barbara A. Atwood, Representing Chil-
dren Who Can't or Won't Direct Counsel: Best Interests Lawyering or No Lawyer at 
All?, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 381 (2011); Andrea Khoury, Why a Lawyer? The Importance 
of Client-Directed Legal Representation for Youth, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 277 (2010). 
60. E.g., Sandra Keen McGlothlin, No More "Rag Dolls in the Corner": A Pro-
posal to Give Children in Custody Disputes a Voice, Respect, Dignity, and Hope, 11 
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 67, 72 (2008) (providing relevant history in section titled "The 
'Parens Patriae Doctrine' and Its Role in the Protection of the Rights of Children. "); 
Mary Patricia Byrn & Jenni Vainik lves, Which Came First the Parent or the Child?, 62 
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that although parents have constitutional rights in the parent-child rela-
tionship, children have independent rights. State agencies step in to pro-
tect those rights and interests when the parents can no longer 
appropriately care for their children.61 The agencies serve in the nature of 
a fiduciary for children's rights, and the agencies' interests and actions are 
intended to align with the best interests of the children.62 It is thus a bitter 
irony that the guardians of children's rights will turn against the children 
whose rights they champion, as the children seek to claim the rights as 
their own. 
In case after case, as children have continued their struggle to break 
through the confidential impediments of the child welfare system to ex-
pand their rights, their agency guardians are always there. But rather than 
aiding their wards, the agencies have lined up against them. For example, 
fighting against the assertion of rights by foster children to a minimum 
quality of care, the Maryland child welfare agency recently argued: 
"[T]he Due Process Clause does not itself impose on the State a genera-
lized duty of optimal care, protection, and treatment to foster children, 
nor does due process demand that a state's administration of a system of 
foster care meet statutorily-defined professional standards .... "63 
The agencies long for the past, when children knew-or were forced 
to accept-their place as voiceless chattel, and the agencies were free to 
act in confidential shadows without interference from constitutional 
RUTGERS L. REV. 305,322 (2010) ("It is well accepted that, pursuant to the doctrine 
of parens patriae, states are obligated to care for vulnerable children. We argue that 
the parens patriae power also obligates states to protect children's constitutional 
rights."); See also Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A Public Role in the Private Family: 
The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act and the Politics of Child Protection and 
Education, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 393, 420 (1996) ("Children have 'needs-based rights' to 
all of our care, rights that flow not from children's autonomy but from their depen-
dency. Because children-mine and yours-are not autonomous independent actors 
responsible for their own survival, they must rely on all of us. While neighborhoods, 
religious communities, informal fostering, adoption, and charities all play significant 
roles in the safety net for children, the buck stops with the State. The State must act in 
its parens patriae role, when the adults in children's lives are unable, refuse, or just 
need a helping hand in providing responsible parenting."). 
61. In re lvey, 319 So.2d 53, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (stating that "the over-
whelming weight of authority throughout the country supports the view that the state, 
as parens patriae, may step in and protect the rights of a child .... "). 
62. See Leonard 1. Rotman, Fiduciary Law's "Holy Grail": Reconciling Theory 
and Practice in Fiduciary Jurisprudence, 91 B.U. L. REV. 921, 939 (2011) (recognizing 
that the fiduciary relationship exists between guardian and ward). 
63. Reply Brief of Appellants at 16 L.J. v. Donald, 633 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 2011), 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 757 (U.S. 2011) (No. 09-2259),2010 WL 2639447 at *9. 
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rights.64 Strikingly, the juvenile court judges of Ohio-the intended arbi-
ters and ultimate protectors of juveniles-similarly pointed to the past in 
their impassioned argument against children's rights as amicus curiae in 
Gault.65 The judges looked to an 1882 decision to warn against placing 
constitutional limitations upon agency actions: 
It is the unquestioned right and imperative duty of every enlight-
ened government, in its character of parens patriae, to protect and 
provide for the comfort and well-being of such of its citizens as, by 
reason of infancy are unable to take care of themselves. The per-
formance of this duty is justly regarded as one of the most impor-
tant of governmental functions, and all constitutional limitations 
must be so understood and construed as not to interfere with its 
proper and legitimate exercise.66 
The judges tried to bring the past forward: 
Does the fact that these problems are now more pressing than 
they have been justify a disregard of precedents going far back in 
time? Those who are ignorant of legal precedents, or choose to 
ignore them, usually can find excuse or reason for doing so. The 
present popularity of resorting to the constitutional safeguards of 
the liberties of the person presents an easy and plausible reason 
for ignoring the fact that children could not possibly grow to pro-
ductive and law-abiding adulthood if they were entitled to those 
liberties which are the perquisites of physical, mental and emo-
tional maturity.67 
In the practices of our nation's child welfare agencIes, not much has 
changed. 
II. AGENCY SELF-INTEREST 
As child welfare agencies have turned against their child benefi-
ciaries' attempts to establish and enforce their rights, the agencies have 
also turned inward. The confidential and loosely chaotic structure of the 
child welfare system has allowed agencies to focus on their own fiscal 
64. See Tn re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967). 
65. Brief of the Ohio Association of Juvenile Court Judges as Amicus Curiae at 
4, Tn re Gault 387 U.S. 1 (1967) 1966 WL 100788 at *3. 
66. Id. at 8. 
67. Id. 
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bottom line rather than solely promoting and protecting the best interests 
of the children.68 
The turn inward has also encompassed a look back, with state agen-
cies reverting back to their ancestral roots in feudal England, when the 
parens patriae doctrine was often used for self-interested fiscal pursuits to 
bring riches to the crown.69 But where the historical financial interests 
were aimed at children of landed gentry as a source of funds, today's 
agency self-interests are directed toward children living in poverty.70 
A. To Serve or Exist? 
Foster care and other agencies serving children's needs have contin-
ued to face stagnate or shrinking budgets and they have increasingly 
turned to revenue maximization strategies to increase agency funds. 71 
Agency self-preservation in such a cash-deprived environment has often 
overcome the interests of those served. The agencies rationalize their ef-
forts as a means of growing agency capacity to serve children in their 
care, but the fiscal strategies result in taking resources directly from the 
children.72 
The strategies are numerous, evolving, and often overlap-but share 
a common trait of using children as a revenue source. As discussed in 
more detail in the section below, foster care agencies target children who 
are themselves disabled, or have deceased or disabled parents, and then 
convert the children's resulting Social Security benefits into agency reve-
nue.73 Similar agency strategies have turned child support enforcement 
practices away from aiding children to agency budgetary concerns.74 
Moreover, as explained in Part III, states are increasingly partnering with 
private industry to convert federal aid intended for vulnerable children 
into private profit and state general revenue.75 
68. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text; Hatcher, supra note 12. 
69. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text. 
70. Id. 
71. Hatcher, supra note 12, at 678. 
72. See id. 
73. Hatcher, supra note 8, at 1799. 
74. See generally Daniel L. Hatcher, Child Support Harming Children: Subordi-
nating the Best Interests of Children to the Fiscal Interests of the State, 42 WAKE FOR-
EST LAW REV. 1029 (2007); Daniel L. Hatcher, Collateral Children: Consequence and 
Illegality at the Intersection of Foster Care and Child Support, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1333 
(2009). 
75. Hatcher, supra note 12, at 677-79. 
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B. Alex and Ryan: Foster Care Agencies Taking Orphans' Survivor 
Benefits 
"You know, the thing is, they are survivor benefits. I am a 
survivor . ... ,,76 
175 
Alex and Ryan have much in common. Both young men entered 
foster care as adolescents,77 and suffered through their parents' deaths 
while in state custody.78 Both were shuffled between multiple placements 
including several group homes.79 Both struggled with the transition to 
adulthoodSO and felt their foster care agency did not adequately serve 
their best interests while in foster care.S1 And both had their Social Secur-
ity survivor benefits taken by their foster care agency without their 
knowledge.s2 
Across the country, child welfare agencies are taking over $250 mil-
lion in assets each year from foster children in their care.S3 The agencies 
seek out children in their care who might be eligible for Social Security 
benefits, either because of the children's disabilities or due to the death 
or disabilities of parents, and then apply for the benefits on the children's 
behalf.s4 Although benefits are an entitlement belonging to the children, 
the agencies do not notify the children of the application or resulting re-
ceipt of funds. s5 The agencies then apply to the Social Security Adminis-
tration (SSA) to be appointed as the children's representative payee to 
gain control over the benefits. Once the agency becomes the payee, they 
convert the money to agency revenue rather than the intended purpose of 
serving the children's individualized needs.s6 Ryan, a teenager in the Bal-
timore City foster care system, describes his reaction to the agency taking 
his Social Security survivor benefits: 
76. In re Ryan, No. 802023006, at 3 (BaIt. City Cir. Ct. June 16,2011) (quoting 
the foster child in disagreement with the child welfare agency's conversion of his So-
cial Security survivor benefits to agency funds) (on file with author). 
77. Brief of Appellant Myers v. Bait. Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. *2 (Md. App. 
Oct. 8,2010) (No. 2765), 2010 WL 4890061; Ryan, at 1. 
78. Brief of Appellant, supra note 77, at *2; Ryan, at 1. 
79. Brief of Appellant, supra note 77, at *2; Ryan, at 1. 
80. Brief of Appellant, supra note 77, at *3-4; Ryan, at 3. 
81. Brief of Appellant, supra note 77, at *3; Ryan, at 3-4. 
82. Brief of Appellant, supra note 77, at *2; Ryan, at 2. 
83. See ADR1ENNE L. FERNANDES-ALCANTARA ET. AL., supra note 9, at 16. 
84. Hatcher, supra note 8, at 1800. 
85. Id. at 1836-37. 
86. Id. at 1805. 
176 NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
When I first wanted to move where I am now, they didn't want to 
do it, meaning they were fighting me. They thought I was better 
where I was in a group home, than be in a foster home where I 
was in a much better school, and getting the help I needed. For 
now, they're supposed to be here for me, but everything that ben-
efits me they're fighting. My parents have passed away, you know. 
I loved my parents to death. I just lost my big brother. If my par-
ents pass away, they would want me to have their work benefits, 
and DSS, they don't need it .... You know, the thing is, they are 
survivor benefits. I am a survivor .... Everyone's passed away, 
besides my aunt. I wish that I'd be able to get this, so I can move 
on with my life, and stop having to fight for everything that bene-
fits me. That's what they ([Baltimore County Department of So-
cial Services]) have been doing. They're my advocates? No they're 
not. To me, they're against me.87 
The same agency practice happened to Alex, and his case is cur-
rently on appeal. Myers v. Baltimore County Department of Social Ser-
vices illustrates the lengths to which a child welfare agency will go to 
convert a child's funds into agency revenue-and to fight the child's ef-
forts to stop the practice.88 The details and legal arguments set out below 
provide a stark example of a state agency turning its parens patriae power 
against the child by ignoring its legal and ethical obligations, and are illus-
trative of agency actions that are occurring nationwide.89 
Alex was twelve when he entered foster care, following his mother's 
death.90 During the six years Alex spent in foster care, he moved at least 
twenty times between temporary placements and relatives', friends', and 
group homes. 91 Soon after losing his mother, Alex's father also died.92 
Unbeknownst to Alex, he was then eligible to benefit from Old-Age, Sur-
vivors, and Disability Insurance funds (OASDI, or survivor benefits), 
which are paid to a child if a deceased parent made sufficient contribu-
tions to the program through payroll taxes.93 Without telling Alex, the 
Baltimore County Department of Social Services (BCDSS) applied for 
survivor benefits on his behalf, and also to become his representative 
payee.94A representative payee is a fiduciary obligated to decide how to 
87. In re Ryan, No. 802023006, at 3 (BaIt. City Cir. Ct. June 16,2011). 
88. Brief of Appellant, supra note 77. The author of this article is also co-counsel 
in the Myers case. 
89. ADRIENNE L. FERNANDES-ALCANTARA ET AL., supra note 9. 
90. Brief of Appellant, supra note 77, at *2. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. 42 U.S.c. § 402(d). 
94. Brief of Appellant, supra note 77, at *2. 
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apply the benefits each month for the beneficiary's use, benefit, and in 
the beneficiary's best interests.95 However, the foster care agency took 
every payment Alex received for a three-year period and kept the money 
for its own purposes.96 Alex struggled during his years in foster care, left 
foster care penniless, and has struggled ever since-unfortunately facing 
the same daunting barriers and statistics that confront foster children 
across the country as they leave foster care.97 
1. Shunning the Constitution, Again 
Several constitutional disputes emerged in the Myers case, including 
unconstitutional takings of a child's property without just compensation,98 
and an equal-protection violation claim that the agency, BCDSS, forced 
orphaned or disabled foster children to pay for their own care but did not 
require other foster children to do SO.99 Perhaps the most striking consti-
tutional failing is the agency's disavowal of Alex's due process rights, 
harking back to the pre-Gault mindset when parens patriae powers were 
used to rationalize the deprivation of children's rights. lOo 
BCDSS began by applying to receive survivor benefits on behalf of 
Alex, the last connection to his deceased father, without letting Alex 
know of the application or that the funds even existed.101 BCDSS did not 
tell Alex when he was determined to be eligible for the benefits, did not 
tell him when it applied to become his representative payee to gain con-
trol over the money, and never sought Alex's input as to how his money 
should be used. Rather the agency kept all of Alex's money to reimburse 
state costs that Alex had no obligation to pay.l02 Then, when Alex left 
foster care and discovered the agency's actions, BCDSS fought against 
Alex's right to file a claim under the state's tort claims act. 103 Although 
Alex filed his claim within one-year after the agency's last actions in tak-
ing his funds, the agency argued the one-year time limit began to run the 
95. 42 U.S.c. § 402(a) (2006); 42 U.S.c. § 405(j)(1)(A) (2006); 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.2035(a) (2011). 
96. Brief of Appellant, supra note 77, at *2-3. In fact, it is likely that the funds 
taken from Alex did not result in additional revenue for the child welfare agency but 
rather were routed into state general revenue. See generally Hatcher, supra note 8, at 
1818. 
97. Brief of Appellant, supra note 77, at *3-4; see infra note 237 and accompa-
nying text. 
98. Brief of Appellant, supra note 77, at *29-30. 
99. Id. at *27-29. 
100. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967). 
101. Id. at *1-4, *25-26. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 4-9. 
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moment it became his representative payee although Alex was then a 
child in foster care and had received no notice of the agency's actions.104 
In fact, notice is required from the SSA when an individual or or-
ganization applies to become a representative payee, in order to give the 
beneficiary an opportunity to object. los But, the SSA sent the notice 
about the child welfare agency's application to become Alex's payee to 
Alex's legal guardian-the child welfare agency itself.106 BCDSS never 
notified Alex after receiving the notice of its own application, but amaz-
ingly asserted such notice as sufficient: 
[The Court] Social Security is really going to notify the fiduciary, 
the person who is responsible for the care? 
[Attorney General's Office]: That's correct. 
The Court: Which would be the State. 
[Attorney General's Office]: Right. 
The Court: Why isn't that a circular argument?I07 
To support its argument against Alex's due process rights, BCDSS 
relied upon Guardianship Estate of Keffeler v. State on remand in Wash-
ington State (Keffeler 11).108 However, the conduct of the agency in Myers 
is distinguishable from Keffeler 11. In Keffeler 11, notice was not sent in 
circular fashion back to the state agency applying to become representa-
tive payee; instead, notice was sent to the child's grandmother who was 
acting as the child's guardian and trying to stop the state from taking her 
grandson'S benefits.109 Nonetheless, BCDSS argued the notice of its own 
application to become Alex's payee, which came back to itself, was suffi-
cient, and that any further notice would be of no valueYo The agency 
reasoned that because Alex did not have the capacity to make his own 
104. Td. 
105. 42 U.S.c. § 405(j)(2)(E)(ii) (2006) (the statutory language currently requires 
that the notice be provided to the child's guardian or to the child's legal 
representative ). 
106. Brief of Appellant, supra note 77, at *8. 
107. Record Extract in Support of Brief of Appellant, Myers v. BaIt. Cnty. Dep't 
of Soc. Servs., No. 2765, 2010 WL 4890061, at B-054-B-055 (Md. Oct. 8, 2010) (on file 
with author). 
108. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler v. State, 88 P.3d 949 (Wash. 2004). 
109. Id. at 955 n.ll. Similarly, although the court found sufficient notice in Mason 
v. Sybinski, 280 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2002), in which Social Security benefits were ap-
plied by the hospital representative payee to reimburse a beneficiary's costs of institu-
tional care, the beneficiaries in that case did receive actual notice. In fact, the 
beneficiaries received notice from both the SSA and from the representative payee, 
even including specific notice that the hospital representative payee intended to use 
the benefits to reimburse costs. See id. at 794. 
110. Record Extract in Support of Brief of Appellant, supra note 107, at 26-27. 
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decisions, and the state agency thus stepped in as payee to make decisions 
on his behalf as his fiduciary, any further notice to him would have been 
fruitless. lll 
This assertion compares strikingly to the pre-Gault rationalizations 
for denying constitutional rights to children-that because the children 
already had the state acting in their best interests under the power of 
parens patriae, they needed no rights of their own. ll2 The agency's effort 
to subvert a child's rights under the guise of acting in its parens patriae 
power is precisely why the Supreme Court held that children must be 
afforded due process rights: at times the courts must step in to protect 
children from the very agencies entrusted to act in their best interests.1l3 
Forty-five years ago the Supreme Court held that children are per-
sons under the Constitution. 114 Thirty-five years ago the Supreme Court 
held that beneficiaries have a protected property interest in their Social 
Security benefits and cannot be deprived of their entitlements by govern-
ment actors without due process.ll5 The role of a state child welfare 
agency as parens patriae does not allow the agency to avoid its constitu-
tional obligations to children in its care. 116 
2. Shirking the Duty to Pay 
The core of BCDSS's argument in the Myers case was that as Alex's 
representative payee, it could legally use his funds to reimburse itself for 
the cost of his care.1I7 The agency ignored a very simple legal and moral 
roadblock to its argument-that the agency, not Alex, had the obligation 
to pay for the foster care costs. Alex did not choose to end up in foster 
care, and the law rightly does not impose a debt obligation upon Alex to 
pay for his own careYs The state agency, however, was required to pay.l19 
111. Id. at 27-28 (stating that when a person has a representative payee, "it has 
already been determined that the individual does not have the ability to manage his 
or her own funds"). 
112. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967). 
113. See id. 
114. Id. at 13. 
115. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976). 
116. See, e.g., Jackson v. United States, No. 07 CY 7216, 2008 WL 4089540, slip 
op. at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 21, 2008) (recognizing that only beneficiaries themselves 
have protected property interests in their government benefits, and that representa-
tive payees do not have a property interest in being a representative payee). 
117. Record Extract in Support of Brief of Appellant, supra note 107, 39-43. 
118. See Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of 
Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371,377-79,382 (2003). 
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Like other states, Maryland participates in the federal foster care 
assistance program under Title IV -E of the Social Security Act. 120 Title 
IV-E is a matching grant program, providing federal payments to im-
prove states' ability to provide foster care, and does so by also requiring 
the states to match the federal funds with state spending on foster care 
services at a required match leve1.121 Unsurprisingly, a state's matching 
share of the costs of children's care must be paid using state funds, and 
the match explicitly cannot be made up of other federal funds, such as 
Social Security benefits.122 But nationwide, likely most, if not every, state 
foster care agency is in violation of the federal requirement and illegally 
using their wards' Social Security benefits to help pay the state's required 
spending-taking, in fact, over $250 million from foster children each 
year by making themselves the payee of their wards.123 
States participating under Title IV-E "shall make foster care mainte-
nance payments on behalf of each child.,,124 The foster care maintenance 
payments must include "payments to cover the cost of (and the cost of 
providing) food, clothing, shelter, daily supervision, school supplies, a 
child's personal incidentals, liability insurance with respect to a child, and 
reasonable travel to the child's home for visitation,"125 as well as reasona-
ble travel for the child to remain in the school in which the child is en-
rolled at the time of placement. Thus, states receiving Title IV-E funds 
are required to pay the current maintenance costs that, in Alex's case, 
BCDSS claims children must pay. In fact, courts have found that foster 
children, as the direct beneficiaries of this federal mandate, have pri-
vately enforceable rights to force states to pay the foster care mainte-
nance payments on their behalf: 
Each of the cited provisions similarly discusses how the state must 
distribute benefits to each child . ... 42 U.S.c. § 672(a)(1) (re-
119. Maryland law explicitly requires that its Department of Social Services 
"shall pay for foster care" for all foster care children. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW 
§§ 5-527(b)-(c) (West 1984). 
120. 42 U.S.c. §§ 670-79(C) (2006). 
121. E.g., 42 U.S.c. §§ 671, 672, 674 (2006); State of Cal. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. 
Thompson, 321 F.3d 835, 839 (9th CiT. 2003); 45 C.F.R. § 92.24 (2010). 
122. 45 C.F.R. § 92.24(b )(1) (2010). 
123. ADRIENNE L. FERNANDES-ALCANTARA ET AL., supra note 9. 
124. 42 U.S.c. § 672(a)(1) (2006). 
125. 42 U.S.c. § 675(4)(A) (2006). As further analogous support, the SSA ex-
plains that "paying legal guardianship fees would not constitute proper use of bene-
fits" if the "[g]uardianship costs and fees are included as part of a state's support 
obligation to the beneficiary ... " Soc. SEC. ADMIN., REPRESENTATIVE PAYEE PRO-
GRAM, TRAINING ORGANIZATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE PAYEES, Unit 6, available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/payee/LessonPlan-2005-2.htm. 
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quiring that "each State with a plan approved under this part shall 
make foster care maintenance payments on behalf of each child") 
(emphasis added). Plainly, these directives are both couched in 
mandatory terms and are unmistakably focused on the benefitted 
class, i.e., foster children.126 
181 
Thus, if a foster child has an enforceable right to force the state to 
pay his foster care maintenance payments, it would be nonsensical-and 
legally incorrect-for the state to have a countervailing ability to force 
the child to pay those same costs. 
Moreover, states participating in the Title IV-E program are prohib-
ited from using other federal funds as part of the required state spending 
a state must incur to secure the federal matching payments.127 The federal 
regulatory requirements governing matching grant programs require that 
"a cost sharing or matching requirement may not be met by costs borne 
by another Federal grant."128 Also, the SSA's Office of Inspector General 
explains that Title IV -E payments are intended to be a match for the 
state's own spending on a child's foster care, so states are prohibited from 
using other federal funds like Social Security survivor benefits (OASDI 
benefits) as part of their share of the costs of providing care: 
Contrary to Federal regulations, HI-DHS [Hawaii Department of 
Human Services] used OASDI benefits to partially reimburse it-
self for the foster care payments it disbursed to the children's 
providers. HI-DHS was unaware that it could not reimburse itself 
for the State's share of Title IV-E costs from a child's OASDI 
benefits .... Federal regulations prohibit HI-DHS from using a 
child's OASDI benefits to reimburse itself for the State's share of 
Title IV-E costs. To receive Federal Title IV-E benefits, HI-DHS 
must pay its share of the foster care costs with State funds. There-
fore, the OASDI benefits for a child who also receives Title IV-E 
benefits must be saved or used for a child's other needs. 129 
126. Connor B. v. Patrick, 771 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D. Mass. 2011); see also C.H. v. 
Payne, 683 F. Supp. 2d 865 (S.D. Ind. 2010); L.J. v. Wilbon, 633 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 
2011) (holding that the Maryland foster care agency failed to establish that there was 
no private right of action of foster children to enforce federal requirements to provide 
individualized foster care case plans and case review system). 
127. 45 C.F.R. § 92.24(b)(1) (2010). 
128. Id. 
129. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., Soc. SEC. ADMIN., HAW. DEP'T OF HUM. 
SERVS.-AN ORG. REP. PAYEE FOR THE Soc. SEC. ADM1N., A-09-08-28045 at 5 
(2008) (emphasis added) (citing 45 C.F.R. § 92.24 (2012)), available at http://oig.ssa. 
gov/sites/defauItlfiles/audit/full/htmI!A-09-08-28045.html; see also DEP'T OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVS., CATALOG OF FED. DOMESTIC ASSISTANCE, FOSTER CARE TI-
TLE IV-E, available at https:llwww.cfda.gov/index?s=program&mode=form&tab=step 
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Thus, the child welfare agency's practice of taking Alex's OASDI 
benefits to reimburse (or replace) its required state spending was explic-
itly prohibited. 
3. Misused Fiduciary Power 
Alex alleged in his complaint that BCDSS violated two distinct fidu-
ciary duties by misusing his survivor benefits. First, Alex alleged BCDSS 
violated its fiduciary duty under state statute and common law and, sec-
ond Alex alleged BCDSS violated its fiduciary duty as representative 
payee under Social Security ActYo Under Maryland law, the child wel-
fare agency was created to protect and serve the best interests of foster 
children.131 This duty to act solely in the best interest of children in its 
care creates a fiduciary obligation owed by the state agency in its role as 
guardian of the children's welfare.132 This fiduciary duty in Maryland, as 
in all states, stems from the common law doctrine of parens patriae in its 
application to protect children-not the fiscal interests of the state. 133 A 
foster care agency simply cannot be allowed to deny a child's rights under 
the assertion of the agency's power to protect the childY4 
1&id=fcOf7151661e7f487b083b57ddb729a9 ("Matching funds from State agencies 
must be appropriated monies raised from non-Federal revenue sources."); DEP'T OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CATALOG OF FEDERAL DOMESTIC ASSISTANCE, 
CFDA Overview, available at https://www.cfda.gov/index?s=generalinfo&mode=list& 
tab=list&tabmode=list (explaining that federal law requires the General Services Ad-
ministration to disseminate federal domestic assistance program information through 
the Catalog of Federal Domestic Affairs). 
130. Brief of Appellant, supra note 77, at *10. 
131. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-525 (West 2011) (requiring that 
agency shall "concurrently develop and implement a permanency plan that is in the 
best interests of the child" and "shall provide 24-hour a day care and supportive ser-
vices for a child who is committed to its custody or guardianship .... "); see also, MD. 
CODE ANN., F AM. LAW § 5-702 (West 2011) (purpose of subtitle is for "each local 
department to give the appropriate service in the best interest of the abused or ne-
glected child"); see also, MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-710 (West 2011) 
("[D]epartment shall render the appropriate services in the best interests of the 
child .... "). 
132. Buxton v. Buxton, 770 A.2d 152, 164 (Md. 2001) (recognizing that a fiduciary 
relationship exists between a guardian and ward); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS § 7 (1959) ("The relation between guardian and ward, like the relation be-
tween trustee and beneficiary, is a fiduciary relation."). 
133. In re Yve S., 819 A.2d 1030, 1041 (Md. 2003); In re Nathaniel A., 864 A.2d 
1066, 1074 (Md. App. 2005). 
134. For example, in In re Gault, the Supreme Court described historical con-
cerns of how misuse of the parens patriae powers can lead to the denial of children's 
due process. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 19 (1967). Further, while the child welfare 
agency's parens patriae power is limited to prohibiting agency actions that may harm a 
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Thus, because the child welfare agency's role as guardian creates a 
clear fiduciary obligation to only act in a child's best interests, the 
agency's actions to take a child's property for a self-serving purpose is a 
clear violation of that duty.135 Alex's guardian-the agency created to 
protect his interests-used its fiduciary power to secretly take his funds to 
repay state costs despite the fact that the agency is legally obligated to 
pay the costs of care, and abused and neglected children have no debt 
obligation to repay those costS.136 
a. State Fiduciary Obligation, Morality, and a Historical Lesson 
BCDSS sought to avoid its fiduciary obligation in the Myers case by 
relying on federal law governing representative payees. 137 Although the 
relevant federal statute clearly requires the payee to determine the use of 
benefits that best serves the beneficiaries, federal regulation indicates the 
best interests test may be met if the funds are used for "current mainte-
nance" costS.138 Thus, BCDSS, and other state foster care agencies across 
the country, argue they are within their rights to take control over chil-
dren's funds and apply the money to reimburse agency costs. 
There are fatal flaws to this argument. Stepping back from the law 
for a moment, it is striking that likely every child welfare agency in our 
child's interests or rights, the juvenile courts' power to protect a child's best interests 
is virtually without bounds. In re Danielle B., 552 A.2d 570, 574 (Md. App. 1989) 
("The court of equity stands as a guardian of all children, and may interfere at any 
time and in any way to protect and advance their welfare and interests.") (internal 
quotation omitted). 
135. Gianakos, Ex'r v. Magiros, 208 A.2d 718, 722 (Md. 1965) ("There is no equi-
table principle more firmly established in our jurisprudence than that a fiduciary is 
under a duty of loyalty to his beneficiaries and cannot use the property of a benefici-
ary for his own purposes."); see also Code Of Maryland Regulations (COMAR) 
07.02.11.07(A) (2011) ("When there is a conflict between the rights of the parents or 
legal guardian and those of the child, the child's best interest shall take precedence."); 
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-502(b)(2) (West 2011) (declaring policy regarding 
foster children "to resolve doubts in favor of the child when there is a conflict be-
tween the interests of a minor child and the interests of an adult"). 
136. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-527(b)-(c) (West 2011) (requiring that the 
"Department shall pay for foster care" for all foster children in single-family homes). 
While a Maryland statute indicates the state may decide to pursue reimbursement of 
the costs from the parents, via child support obligations assigned to the government, 
MD. CODE ANN. CTS. & J UD. PROC. § 3-819(1) (West 2011), no statutory authority 
exists for the agency to seek payment from foster children. See also Wash. State Dep't 
of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 377-79, 382 
(recognizing that foster children have no debt obligation for their own care). 
137. Record Extract in Support of Brief of Appellant, supra note 107, at *39-43. 
138. 20 C.F.R. § 404.2040(a) (2012). 
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country is engaged in this practice.139 These agencies are the guardians of 
our nation's most vulnerable children, and they are taking either the last 
remaining assets left to children from their deceased parents, or are tak-
ing the benefits intended to aid children's disabling conditions. 14o The 
agencies are inverting the parens patriae power again, as was done 
thousands of years ago in feudal England when children were considered 
burdens, chattel, and bastards-and the children's assets were taken to 
provide revenue to the crown. 141 
Yet even if morality, ethical obligation, and historical lessons are 
overlooked, contemporary U.S. law is also no help to the agencies' legal 
justification for taking money from their wards. A foster care agency act-
ing as representative payee operates under not one, but two fiduciary ob-
ligations: the state law and the federal law that govern representative 
payees.142 The fiduciary duties are related, but are governed by different 
and distinct legal frameworks. Thus, when the foster care agency, already 
under fiduciary obligation via state law, voluntarily seeks the additional 
fiduciary obligation of representative payee, the agency cannot shirk its 
state fiduciary requirements. 143 Even if federal law might provide a repre-
sentative payee discretion to apply benefits to current maintenance costs, 
any exercise of discretion cannot conflict with the agency's inherent obli-
gations to only act in the children's best interests in its role as guardian 
under state law.144 
b. Federal Fiduciary Obligation 
Federal law also provides no cover for the foster care agencies' ac-
tions. The practice reached the Supreme Court in 2003,145 and it may very 
139. See ADRIENNE L. FERNANDES-ALCANTARA ET AL., supra note 9. 
140. [d. 
141. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text; Gill v. Ripley, 724 A.2d 88, 
100 n.6 (1999) (regarding the past terminology and premises of the "Maryland Bas-
tardy Act"). The Maryland Court of Appeals further noted: 
[d. 
Throughout history, children born out of wedlock have been referred to as 
"illegitimate." The term "bastard" itself has been regarded as odious, not fit 
for use in polite conversation .... At early common law, there may have 
been a basis for those connotations, as such children had few rights under the 
law .... It is simply impermissible now for courts to refer to children in that 
manner. Children are never "illegitimate," and certainly are not so because of 
their parents' circumstances. 
142. Brief of Appellant, supra note 77, at *10. 
143. [d. 
144. [d. 
145. Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Kef-
feler, 537 U.S. 371 (2003). 
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well end up before the Court again. In Myers, the BCDSS relied heavily 
on the Supreme Court's decision in Keffeler, contending that that deci-
sion validated the agency's practices.146 The Baltimore City Circuit Court 
agreed in its dismissal of Alex's claims.147 But the Keffeler decision, al-
though broad at times in its language, is quite limited in its holding. In 
Keffeler, the Supreme Court concluded that a state agency did not violate 
the anti-attachment provision of the Social Security Act by applying chil-
dren's Social Security benefits to reimburse the costs of care.148 The Court 
did not reach any other possible challenges to the practice, including 
breach of fiduciary duty claims under state or federallaw. 149 
In Myers, Alex contended the child welfare agency undertook an 
additional fiduciary obligation under federal law when it sought to be-
come his representative payee.150 This argument is supported squarely by 
the Social Security Act, which requires representative payees to use So-
cial Security benefits in a manner that they determine is in the benefici-
ary's best interest. l5l Further, the fiduciary obligation is reiterated in the 
SSA's policy manual, the Program Operations Manual System (POMS).152 
POMS sets out the irrefutable overarching obligation: "In making repre-
sentative payee decisions, the most important consideration is the claim-
146. Record Extract in Support of Brief of Appellant, supra note 107, at *39-43. 
147. Id. at *39-43. 
148. Keffcler, 537 U.S. at 375. 
149. In Myers, the plaintiff alleged that the agency violated § 405(j) of the Social 
Security Act by failing to consider his best interest and to exercise discretion in its use 
of his OASDI benefits. In Keffeler, the Supreme Court was clear that it did not ad-
dress § 405(j) claims mirroring those raised by Alex: 
Respondents also go beyond the § 407(a) [anti-attachment provision] issue to 
argue that the department violates § 405(.0 itself, by, for example, failing to 
exercise discretion in how it uses benefits, periodically "sweeping" benefi-
ciaries' accounts to pay for past care, and "double dipping" by using benefits 
to reimburse the State for costs previously recouped from other sources. 
These allegations, and respondents' § 405(j) stand-alone arguments more gen-
erally, are far afield of the question on which we granted certiorari .... Ac-
cordingly, we decline to reach respondents' § 405(.0 arguments here, except 
insofar as they relate to the proper interpretation of § 407(a). Respondents 
are free to press their stand-alone § 405(j) arguments before the Commis-
sioner, who bears responsibility for overseeing representative payees, or else-
where as appropriate. 
Id. at 390 n.12. 
150. Brief of Appellant, supra note 77, at *10. 
151. 42 U.S.C. § 405(j) (2006); 20 C.F.R. § 404.2035(a) (2006) (stating that the 
"representative payee has a responsibility to [u ]se the benefits received on your be-
half only for your use and benefit in a manner and for the purposes he or she deter-
mines ... to be in your best interests .... "). 
152. See Keffeler, 537 U.S. at 385 ("While these [POMS] administrative interpre-
tations are not products of formal rulemaking, they nevertheless warrant respect."). 
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ant's best interest."153 Were that not sufficiently clear, POMS directs SSA 
staff to ensure that "the payee understands the fiduciary nature of the 
relationship, and that benefits belong to the beneficiary and are not the 
property of the payee.,,154 
It is difficult to articulate how Alex received any benefit from the 
agency's use of his funds. He received no changed or increased services 
from BCDSS's decision to apply his money to state costs, because the 
agency was already obligated to provide the services he received.155 In 
fact, throughout its brief on appeal, BCDSS does not attempt to explain 
how its decision regarding the use of his funds was in his best interests in 
any way.156 The agency charged with caring for Alex's interests took the 
only asset left to him by his deceased father, and Alex ultimately left 
foster care penniless.157 
Although comparison might be made to a relative acting as repre-
sentative payee who decides to apply the funds to family costs, the situa-
tion of child welfare agencies taking the funds is completely different. If 
Alex's representative payee was a family member who used his funds for 
the family's cost of his care, Alex would likely have benefited because 
more resources would have been available for the entire family in which 
he lived.15s In contrast, when BCDSS took Alex's funds neither Alex nor 
the household in which he lived received any benefit.159 In addition to 
153. Soc. SEC. ADM1N., PROGRAM OPERATlONS MANUAL SYSTEM, § GN 00501. 
005(E)(1), Overview of Representative Payment (2012), available at https://secure. 
ssa. gov / poms. nsf / 0/06b4b46d5a2ec9bf8525754c0005d046! OpenDocument & Click =. 
Further, the POMS also requires that a representative payee must exercise discretion, 
and apply the benefits "in the best interests of the beneficiary, according to his/her 
best judgment .... " Soc. SEC. ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM, 
§ GN 00602.001, USE OF BENEFITS (2011), available at https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/ 
poms.nsf/lnx/0200602001. 
154. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATlONS MANUAL SYSTEM, § GN 
00602.001, USE OF BENEFITS (2011), available at https://secure.ssa.gov/appslO/poms. 
nsf/lnxl0200602001. 
155. Brief of Appellant, supra note 77, at *14-17. 
156. Brief of Appellees, Myers v. Balt. Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs, (Md. App. Dec. 
29,2010) (No. 2765), 2010 WL 6526220. 
157. Brief of Appellant, supra note 77, at *2-4. 
158. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 606-607 (1987) (concluding that child 
support assignment requirements for welfare recipients did not constitute unconstitu-
tional takings, the Court recognized that the child benefited from increased welfare 
payments by giving up child support in that the family as a whole was better off). 
159. In fact, Alex would have been better off even if the agency refused to serve 
as representative payee. If the foster care agency did not serve as payee, then SSA 
would have been obligated to conserve the funds and provide them to a suitable 
payee or directly to Alex either at the age of majority or younger if no other suitable 
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Alex receiving no benefit, the BCDSS and other foster children also 
likely received no benefit. As explained further in Part III, the funds are 
often routed to general state revenue through this process rather than to 
provide additional funds to the foster care programs. 
Despite the overwhelming clarity of how the child welfare agency's 
use of the funds conflicted with the best interests of Alex, the agency 
sought to side-step the conflict by claiming federal law provided a safe-
harbor for its actions.16o Illustrating just how far the agency was willing to 
go in its argument, the agency claimed it had no duty to exercise any 
discretion whatsoever as representative payee for Alex.161 Because 
BCDSS concluded it has no duty to exercise discretion, but rather to sim-
ply adhere to a blanket rule of automatically taking foster children's 
funds, the agency described its actions accordingly: "The actions of 
BCDSS in receiving and disbursing payments through time as a represen-
tative payee are merely the continuing aspects of a unitary action that 
was initiated when BCDSS became the representative payee.,,162 
The agency pointed to the following language in the federal regula-
tion for the assertion that adhering to a rule of automatic self-reimburse-
ment with a foster child's funds is appropriate, rather than making 
individualized decisions about the child's best interests: "We will consider 
that payments we certify to a representative payee have been used for the 
use and benefit of the beneficiary if they are used for the beneficiary's 
current maintenance. Current maintenance includes cost incurred in ob-
taining food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and personal comfort 
items.,,163 In fact, the Maryland agency has actually gone further than tak-
ing Social Security benefits from children in its care-promulgating a reg-
ulation requiring that all of the resources belonging to foster children 
"shall be applied directly to the cost of care.,,164 
The agency's assertion that it had no duty to exercise discretion as 
Alex's representative payee flies in the face of the foundational principles 
governing its fiduciary role as representative payee, and conflicts with the 
payee could be located and SSA did not determine that direct payment would cause 
substantial harm. 20 c.P.R. §§ 404.2010(b); 404.2011 (2011). 
160. Brief of Appellees, supra note 156, at 18-19. 
161. Id. at *21-23. 
162. Id. at *14. 
163. 20 c.P.R. § 404.2040(a) (2012). 
164. MD. CODE REGS. 07.02.11.29 (2011). The regulation is argued to be invalid 
in Myers, in violation of the federal and state law and constitutions, and the state 
Administrative Procedures Act. Brief of Appellant, supra note 77, at *32-34 (citing 
this regulation in the brief as 07.02.11.26 because the state amended the code after the 
complaint was filed). 
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agency's core purpose to serve the best interests of foster children. 165 
Courts have repeatedly rejected such blanket rules that interfere with a 
representative payee's exercise of fiduciary discretion, including the Ma-
ryland Court of Special Appeals in Ecolono v. Div. of Reimbursements of 
Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene: 
[W]e are left with the conclusion that, under federal law, a repre-
sentative payee has a duty to exercise discretion and, in fact, the 
[Department] did not exercise discretion. As a result, we shall re-
verse and remand so that the Secretary can exercise discretion and 
determine whether any or all of the funds applied to the cost of 
current maintenance should be refunded to appellant or applied 
to other charges. 166 
Other courts have ruled consistently with Ecolono. The Sixth Circuit 
rejected such a rule that automatically assigned Social Security benefits to 
a beneficiary's child, finding that "[t]he practical effect of this policy is to 
directly allocate these funds to one other than the intended beneficiary, 
thereby eliminating the representative payee's discretion to determine 
how the benefits should be spent on the beneficiary's behalf."167 The Sec-
ond Circuit also reached a similar conclusion.168 
In In re J.G., the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that a child 
welfare agency acting as representative payee must exercise discretion, 
Although [the child welfare agency] implies that it is always 
proper for it to reimburse itself for the cost of J.G.'s care using 
J.G.'s Social Security funds, even the Department of Social and 
Health Services in Keffeler acknowledged that it was not always 
appropriate to use all of a juvenile's Social Security funds to reim-
burse itself, in particular in anticipation of "impending 
emancipation. ,,169 
165. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., PAM. LAW §§ 5-525(f)(1) ("In developing a per-
manency plan for a child in an out-of-home placement, the local department shall give 
primary consideration to the best interests of the child."); 5-702 ("requiring each local 
department to give the appropriate service in the best interest of the abused or ne-
glected child"); 5-710 ("Based on its findings and treatment plan, the local depart-
ment shall render the appropriate services in the best interests of the child.") (West 
2011). 
166. Ecolono v. Div. of Reimbursements of Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, 
769 A.2d 296, 313 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001). 
167. Snider v. Creasy, 728 F.2d 369, 372 (6th Cir. 1984). 
168. See Riddick v. D'Elia, 626 F.2d 1084, 1089 (2d Cir. 1980). 
169. In re J.G., 652 S.E.2d 266, 273 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Wash. Dep't of 
Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371 at 378-79). 
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The court recognized the limits of the Supreme Court's decision in Kef-
feler and concluded that an agency representative payee cannot satisfy its 
obligations to serve a foster child's best interest by automatically applying 
the child's benefits to reimburse the costs of foster care yo The foster care 
agency in 1. G. initially intervened to become the boy's representative 
payee after his relatives misused his Social Security benefits, but then the 
agency also applied J.G.'s funds for the agency's own self-interested pur-
pose.l7l The agency charged with protecting J.G.'s best interests decided 
to keep his benefits to reimburse state costs rather than use the money to 
pay the mortgage payments for a Habitat for Humanity home J.G. inher-
ited from his deceased stepfather: 
DSS made no payments toward the Habitat mortgage. Instead, 
DSS applied those funds ... toward the cost of J.G.'s foster 
care .... In 2005, the Habitat home was valued at approximately 
$80,000.00, and Habitat for Humanity held the outstanding mort-
gage of approximately $27,000.00. Because the mortgage was not 
being paid, Habitat for Humanity initiated foreclosure 
proceedings. 172 
The trial court found that "DSS's use of J.G.'s Social Security benefits to 
reimburse itself, rather than make the $221.00 monthly Habitat mortgage 
payment, had not been reasonable,,,!73 and the North Carolina Court of 
Appeals upheld the decision: 
Here, both the guardian ad litem and the trial court acted consist-
ently with their supervisory roles in seeing to J.G.'s best interests, 
and J.G.'s best interests were central to the court's order, which 
noted that if Habitat for Humanity foreclosed on the Habitat 
home, J.G. would receive very little money from the sale and 
would be homeless when he aged out of foster care .... Although 
DSS implies that it is always proper for it to reimburse itself for 
the cost of J.G.'s care using J.G.'s Social Security funds, even the 
Department of Social and Health Services in Keffeler, acknowl-
edged that it was not always appropriate to use all of a juvenile's 
Social Security funds to reimburse itself, in particular in anticipa-
tion of impending emancipation.174 
170. In re J.G., 652 S.E.2d 266, 272-273 & n.3 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007). 
171. Id. at 268-69. 
172. Id. at 269. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 273 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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In addition to caselaw, the governing federal statutory and regula-
tory language, as well as the SSA's own guidance, clearly establish the 
obvious-that a representative payee is a fiduciary, and therefore must 
exercise individualized discretion in deciding how to use Social Security 
funds in the best interests of the beneficiary.175 The payee's decision in-
cludes countless options, depending on what is best for the individual 
child at the time of the decision, including: (1) possibly applying the bene-
fits toward current maintenance (if not already provided for); (2) consid-
ering how to allocate the funds among the different categories of possible 
unmet current maintenance needs; (3) deciding whether to apply the 
money toward other foreseeable or special needs; or (4) deciding to con-
serve the benefits for future needs if current needs are already met. The 
endless possibilities and changing circumstances are precisely why a rep-
resentative payee is appointed, to weigh all the options and make individ-
ualized decisions to best meet the child's evolving needs.176 
c. A Child Welfare Agency's Assertion that It's Illegal-and Overly 
Burdensome-to Serve the Interests of Children 
The child welfare agency in Myers offered numerous attempts to 
dodge its fiduciary obligations in order to justify the agency's fiscally self-
serving conduct. Despite the clear weight, clarity, and common sense of 
the law, BCDSS not only asserted it simply had no obligation to exercise 
any discretion, but went even further to contend it would have violated 
federal law if it did exercise discretion. 177 Next, the agency asserted that if 
it had to actually exercise discretion to determine the best interests of 
foster children, then serving as the children's representative payee would 
be too burdensome.178 By arguing that it would have violated federal law 
175. See, e.g., infra notes 180, 183-185 and accompanying text. 
176. Although Alex was a teenager able to communicate his needs, DSS never 
met with Alex to discuss the best use of his benefits. Brief of Appellant, supra note 77, 
at *2. In fact, an audit completed the same year that DSS began taking Alex's benefits 
found that in almost half of foster children's cases there was no record of the required 
contacts between the DSS caseworker and the child or the foster parent. OFFICE OF 
LEGISLATIVE AUDITS, DEP'T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVS., MD. GEN. ASSEMBLY, PER-
FORMANCE AUDIT REPORT: DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES SOCIAL SERVICES 
ADMINISTRATION OUT-OF-HoME CARE PROGRAM 6 (2002), available at http://www. 
ola.state.md.us/Reports/Performance/FosterCare.pdf. 
177. See Brief of Appellees, supra note 156, at *20. 
178. [d. at 23. BCDSS argues: 
The SSA does not contemplate that an agency acting as a representative 
payee must exercise individualized discretion as to how to utilize every benefit 
dollar received. If that were the case, many agencies would cease to act as 
representative payees because of the tremendous burden that would accom-
pany such a requirement. 
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by exercising discretion to determine the best use of an orphaned foster 
child's Social Security benefits, BCDSS attempts to turn the requirements 
of Social Security Act-and the foundations of fiduciary law-on their 
heads. 179 
The exercise of discretion in the interests of the beneficiary lies at 
the heart of any fiduciary relationship.180 Upon promulgation of its fed-
eral regulations, the SSA could not have refuted the child welfare 
agency's argument more directly: "[a ]lthough we provide guidelines as to 
what is in the beneficiary's best interests, there is a considerable amount 
of discretion provided to the payee. "181 Also, additional SSA guidance 
encourages representative payees to actively consider both "current 
needs and reasonably foreseeable needs," and to specifically consider 
conserving the benefits for children who may need assistance with the 
transition to independence.182 The SSA's guidance indicates that payees 
should consider reasonably foreseeable needs such as future education 
expenses, and directs that: "If the beneficiary is a child who will attain age 
18 in the near future, consider the need to conserve funds for transition 
into an independent living arrangement, future education or occupational 
training."183 The SSA has explained how conserved Social Security bene-
fits are necessary for children as they transition out of foster care: "Our 
current regulatory process is particularly problematic for those benefi-
ciaries who make the transition out of foster care and for their payees. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
179. See id. at 20. 
180. See, e.g., Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1100 (Ill. 1997) (in-
ternal citation omitted) ("[A]t the heart of a fiduciary relationship is trust, loyalty, 
and faith in the discretion of the fiduciary .... "); Ossenbeck v. Hamilton County 
Auditor, 638 N.E.2d 120, 123 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Yarosh v. Becane, 406 
N.E.2d 1355, 1360 (Ohio 1980)) ("Where no discretion is involved and where tasks 
are clearly routine, a fiduciary relationship clearly does not exist."). 
181. Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance and SSI for the Aged, 
Blind and Disable; Representative Payment, 47 Fed. Reg. 30,468-01 (July 14, 1982); 
see also In re Estate of Merritt, 651 N.E.2d 680, 683 (III. App. 1995) (stating that "the 
regulations are broadly phrased, thereby affording a representative payee wide discre-
tion to use funds in the best interests of the beneficiary, not the State."). 
182. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM, § GN 
00602.030, Payment of Beneficiary's Past Due Debts-Claims of Creditors (2011), 
available at https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnxl0200602030. 
183. Id.; see also Soc. SEC. ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM, 
§ ON 00602.001, Use of Benefits (2011), available at https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/ 
Inx/0200602001 (indicating that "[a] payee must use benefits to provide for the benefi-
ciary'S current needs ... or for reasonably foreseeable needs. If not needed for these 
purposes ... the payee must conserve or invest benefits on behalf of the beneficiary"). 
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These beneficiaries might need immediate access to the conserved funds 
to pay for rent or other necessities. ,,184 
The child welfare agency contends that making decisions about how 
to use Social Security funds in foster children's best interests would sim-
ply be too much work, and it issued a threat that the "tremendous bur-
den" of having to make such decisions on behalf of foster children would 
cause foster care agencies to stop serving as representative payees.18S The 
agency's threat does not have a valid legal foundation and illustrates the 
extent to which its fiscal self-interests are distorting the agency's view of 
its obligations as guardian and fiduciary for abused and neglected 
children. 186 
The SSA clearly explains that organizational representative payees 
serving as fiduciaries for multiple beneficiaries must consider the best in-
terests of each individual beneficiary. An SSA training manual for organi-
zational representative payees directs that "[t]he most important duty of 
all payees is to know the needs of each beneficiary and to use the benefits 
in the best interest of the beneficiary."187 The guidance also provides obvi-
ous advice-that organizational representative payees should collaborate 
with each beneficiary to decide how to best use the beneficiary's funds. 
Thus, "SSA recognizes that representative payment works best when 
there is collaboration between SSA, the payee and the beneficiary."188 
The SSA provides examples of how a payee should involve each benefici-
ary in making individualized decisions: 
184. Transfer of Accumulated Benefit Payments, 75 Fed. Reg. 7,551-01 (Feb. 2, 
201 0) (explaining final rule that made it easier to transfer conserved funds directly to 
the beneficiary). The Supreme Court in Keffeler also placed importance on the fact 
that the agency payee exercised discretion to occasionally forgo reimbursement in 
order use the funds for special needs or "to conserve a child's resources for expenses 
anticipated on impending emancipation." Wash. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. 
Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 379 (emphasis added); see also In re 
J.G., 652 S.E.2d 266, 273. 
185. Brief of Appellees, supra note 156, at *23. 
186. Such an agency view, if taken further, might also cause the agency to argue 
that it would be overly burdensome to make individualized decisions regarding, for 
example, foster children's placements, permanency plans, educational needs, and 
health needs. See L.J. v. Wilbon, 633 F.3d 297 (4th Cir. 2011) (upholding enforceabil-
ity of consent decree due to Maryland foster care agency's systemic failures to adhere 
to federal requirements for providing foster care services, including required individu-
alized case plans). 
187. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., Lesson Plan, Training Organizational Representative 
Payees, Unit 4, available at http://www.ssa.gov/payee/LessonPlan-2005-2.htm#UNIT4. 
188. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., Lesson Plan, Training Organizational Representative 
Payees, Unit 2, available at http://www.ssa.gov/payee/LessonPlan-2005-2.htm#UNIT2. 
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• Meet regularly with the beneficiary (preferably face-to-face); 
• Establish a budget, discuss it with the beneficiary, and involve 
him/her as much as possible in financial decisions; 
• Explain Social Security and/or SSI [Supplemental Security In-
come] payments and the beneficiary's expenses to him or her; 
• Ensure that the beneficiary is aware of current and large retro-
active payments .... 189 
193 
There is irony in the child welfare agency's threat. If the agency had 
quit its role as Alex's representative payee, a different representative 
payee who would fulfill its obligations to Alex's best interests could have 
been selected.190 Thus, BCDSS would not have been able to force another 
payee to send the money to the agency to reimburse the foster care costs 
because foster children have no debt obligation for their own care. 191 In 
fact, if no other individual or organization was willing to serve as Alex's 
payee when the agency quit, SSA would have simply conserved the funds 
and provided them either to a payee when located or directly to Alex 
when he reached the age of majority (if no payee was needed at that 
time).192 
The point is simple: if the child welfare agency is not willing to fulfill 
its fiduciary obligations, then the agency should simply not apply to serve 
as representative payee for foster children. 193 If the agency's suggestion 
for a representative payee system that is discretionless and amounts to 
automatic cost reimbursement were realized, the system would be mean-
ingless and a waste of administrative costs. Appointment of a fiduciary 
would be unnecessary to simply automatically route funds from the SSA 
directly to the state's coffers. Managing Social Security benefits for the 
individualized best interests of abused and neglected children is indeed 
difficult, but such difficulty is precisely why a fiduciary is appointed: "Or-
ganizations really do make a difference when they act as pay-
ees. . .because they provide a critical service to one of the most 
189. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 187; see also Soc. SEC. ADMIN., F AQs for 
Representative Payees, http://www.ssa.gov/payee/faqrep.htm (encouraging "payees to 
go beyond just managing finances and to be actively involved in the beneficiary's 
life"). 
190. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.2011 (2011). 
191. See Wash. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 
537 U.S. 371, 389. 
192. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.2011 (2011). 
193. For a comparison to payees requiring compensation, see Soc. SEC. ADMIN., 
PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM, § GN00502.113, Interviewing the Payee 
Applicant (2011), available at https:llsecure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0200502113 ("If the 
payee tells you that, [sic] he or she will not carry out his fiduciary responsibilities 
without compensation, deny the application, and seek another payee."). 
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vulnerable segments of our population. Being a representative payee can 
be very demanding, but it can also be very rewarding. Representative 
payees can make a difference. "194 
III. LAYERS TO THE CONFLICT 
The conflict between human service agencies' purpose of serving the 
best interests of children and their use of the parens patriae power to 
serve their own fiscal interests is further complicated on multiple interre-
lationship levels. First, the conflict exists within the complicated fiscal 
federalism arrangement between the federal government and the states, 
which provides the funding structure for grant-in-aid programs. 195 Second, 
a poverty industry has grown and profited from the billions in grant-in-
aid dollars flowing from the federal government to the states and has 
added to the conflict by encouraging state agency strategies to increase 
claims of the federal funds. 196 Third, the state human service agencies' 
interests may further conflict with the fiscal interests of their parent 
states. 
A. Fiscal Federalism 
Fiscal federalism is an economic theory upon which our country's 
largest federal grant-in-aid funds are founded, including Medicaid and 
the federal program to provide foster care funding under Title IV -E of 
the Social Security Act (Title IV-E Foster Care ).197 The economic struc-
ture of fiscal federalism aims to create a partnership between the relative 
strengths of the federal and state governments.198 However, as state 
human service agencies seek to maximize their benefit from the federal 
government's financial power, the alleged strengths of localized state 
agencies in addressing regional and individualized needs of their benefi-
ciaries often give way to their self-interested revenue strategies. 199 
Under the fiscal federalism theory's application, the federal govern-
ment provides states with matching funds that are intended to increase 
194. Soc. SEC. ADMIN., Representative Payee Program Fact Sheet, http://www. 
ssa.gov/payee/factsheetengl.htm. 
195. See infra note 197 and accompanying text. 
196. See infra note 204 and accompanying text. 
197. See Super, supra note 14, at 2586 (describing application of fiscal federalism 
in matching grant programs, including Medicaid); see also Hatcher, supra note 12, at 
676. 
198. Super, supra note 14, at 2544; see Somin, supra note 14; WALLACE E. OATES, 
FISCAL FEDERALISM (1972). 
199. Hatcher, supra note 12, at 689-90. 
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the ability of states to provide program services at the local leveUoo The 
federal government's centralized ability to raise revenue and to withstand 
economic downturns is paired with the view that states are better able to 
understand and serve the more localized and varying needs of their citi-
zens.201 At the heart of the theory is the idealistic notion that "govern-
ment agencies, as 'custodians of the public interest,' would seek to 
maximize social welfare.,,202 
However, as the examples above illustrate, the purity of government 
action in serving the social welfare is often lacking, as the government 
agencies may seek to serve themselves. During lean economic times, ser-
vices and programs for vulnerable popUlations are in much higher de-
mand but also are among the first programs states will cut to balance the 
budget.203 Thus, especially during economic turmoil, state agencies may 
find themselves desperate for additional funding-to the point where the 
agencies' focus turns more to the search for money than on serving their 
intended beneficiaries. 
The fiscal federalism structure can add to this conflict. The complex-
ities of the eligibility and claiming process of the grant-in-aid programs, 
and the billions in funds potentially available, often cause the agencies to 
increase their gamesmanship and focus toward the fiscal pursuit while 
sometimes forgetting their reason for existence.204 As the following sec-
tions describe, a vast poverty industry is heightening this conflict, as well 
as the tension between the state agencies and their parent states. 
B. Poverty Industry 
The conflict between the intended benign service mission of human 
service agencies with the agencies' fiscal self-interests is further height-
ened by an industry seeking to profit from the billions in federal grant-in-
aid funds available. An entire poverty industry has grown from the fund-
ing in federal grant-in-aid programs and the desire of state agencies to 
maximize the federal funds. 205 
This poverty-industrial complex now includes connections of con-
tracts between private industry and the state and federal governments to 
provide services in all aspects of government services for vulnerable 
200. ld. at 685-89. 
201. Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 1. ECON. LITERATURE 
1120, 1121-22 (1999). 
202. Wallace E. Oates, Toward a Second-Generation Theory of Fiscal Federalism, 
12 INT'L TAX & PUB. FINANCE 349, 350 (2005). 
203. Donenberg, supra note 7, at 1498 n.100. 
204. Hatcher, supra note 12, at 705-13. 
205. ld. at 689-92. 
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populations.206 The industry is rife with conflicts of interest, pay-to-play 
tactics, and a revolving door of personnel between the industry and the 
agencies they serve.207 
As the industry continues to take hold of operational services, pri-
vate contractors are now also aiming directly at the source of federal 
funds. State agencies seek out every federal dollar they can find, and con-
sultants have capitalized upon the frantic search by developing often 
questionable-if not illegal-strategies to claim additional federal funds 
with the contractors, often taking a significant percentage as a contin-
gency fee. 20s Because federal grant-in-aid funds are structured with com-
plex eligibility requirements, these revenue maximization consultants 
have stepped in to help, and to profit.209 Illustrating the scope of the ser-
vices and profits being made, the revenue maximization strategies involv-
ing Medicaid claims in only two states led to increased federal payments 
of over $2 billion over four years, including over $90 million paid to the 
revenue maximization consultants as contingency fees. 2lO 
In the context of the federal grant-in-aid program for state foster 
care services, the revenue maximization consultants aim to increase Title 
IV-E Foster Care claims by increasing the eligibility rate for children in 
state care.211 While the Title IV-E rules for eligibility are complicated, 
they are based upon a foundational principle that states should only re-
ceive the federal funds when they remove a child from an impoverished 
household.212 Thus, the private contractors develop strategies to increase 
206. [d. 
207. [d. 
208. See, e.g., ADAM CARASSO & ROSEANNA BESS, URBAN INSTITUTE, THE DIS-
POSITION OF FEDERAL DOLLARS IN FLORIDA's SOCIAL SERVICES: INFORMING A FED-
ERAL FUNDING MAXIMIZATION STRATEGY, 32-34 (2003), available at http://www. 
urban.org/UploadedPDF/410822_federal_dollars.pdf; Hatcher, supra note 8, at 
1807-10. 
209. See generally U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICAID FINANCING: 
STATES' USE OF CONTINGENcy-FEE CONSULTANTS TO MAXIMIZE FEDERAL REIM-
BURSEMENTS HIGHLIGHTS NEED FOR IMPROVED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT (2005), availa-
ble at http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/246870.pdf. 
210. [d. at 4. 
211. Hatcher, supra note 8, at 1821; see also Public Consulting Group, Child 
Welfare and Youth Services, Title IV-E Case Reviews, available at http://www.public 
consultinggroup . com / HumanServices / Child Welfare / TitleiVECaseReviews . html 
("PCG Human Services™ is a national expert in Title IV -E regulation and eligibility 
determination guidelines. We have extensive experience in helping states navigate 
ongoing eligibility determination processes. We can help you ensure federal compli-
ance with your case reviews and help enhance your title IV-E revenue."). 
212. As one of the Title IV-E requirements, states must show that the child was 
removed from a home that would have been eligible for welfare assistance under the 
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the "penetration rate" for foster care agencies-meaning an effort to in-
crease the percentage of children in agency care who were taken from 
poor families.213 In addition to the aim of increasing agency's penetration 
rates, the consultants also create strategies to maximize the federal foster 
care funds by increasing claims for Title IV-E administrative costs, often 
including millions in retroactive claims, and also increasing claims for 
training expenditures.214 
In the context of foster children's Social Security benefits, not only 
are the state agencies engaged in tactics to take the children's funds but 
they are also employing private revenue maximization consultants to help 
in the process.215 For example, the Public Consulting Group (PCG) claims 
to be the largest vendor in the country pursuing foster children's Social 
Security benefits, through its Social Security Advocacy Management Ser-
vices?16 The company helps the foster care agencies look for children who 
are disabled or have deceased parents, files the applications, handles re-
determinations and reviews, completes required representative payee ac-
counting reports, and even takes over "financial management assistance 
of awarded benefits" that ultimately results in the children's funds being 
used as a revenue stream for the agencies. The company describes the 
revenue producing prospects: "PCG Human Services is now the SSI ven-
dor for Foster Care agencies representing over 30,000 children in Califor-
nia. To date, the firm has generated over $150 million in additional 
revenue for these agencies.,,217 
Similarly, Disability Associates of America developed a slide pres-
entation where it advertises the benefits to its prospective clients of hiring 
the company to track down foster children's Social Security benefits: "It's 
a funding mechanism to pay the child's cost of care with Federal Dollars 
old Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) rules. 42 U.S.c. § 672(a)(1)(B) 
(2006). 
213. See Title IV-E Federal Government Funding Overview, WISCONSIN DEP'T OF 
CHILDREN & FAMILIES (June 16,2008), http://www.dhfs.state.wi.us/Children/TitieIV-
E/progserv/FedGov FundingPortion.HTM ("Frequently, the percentage of IV-E eligi-
ble children is referred to as the state's IV-E 'penetration rate."'). 
214. CARASSO & BESS, supra note 208, at 53-56. 
215. Hatcher, supra note 8, at 1807-10. 
216. Social Security Advocacy Management Services-SSAMSTM Offerings for Fos-
ter Care Agencies, PUBLIC CONSULTING GROUP (2012), http://www.publicconsuIting 
group.com/humanservices/SSCSSDIIssi_for_fostercare.html. 
217. Case Study: California SSI Advocacy, PUBLIC CONSULTING GROUP (2012), 
http://www.publicconsultinggroup.com/humanservices/library / case _studies/ CA_SSI. 
html. 
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and not State & Local Tax Dollars."218 The company takes a 25 percent 
contingency fee from past-due benefits for its services, including its ser-
vices of helping the foster care agency take over control of the funds by 
changing the payee when someone other than the agency is serving as 
representative payee.219 
The overt focus on money can cause the foster care agencies to alter 
practices toward maximizing funds rather than maximizing services to 
best meet the needs of children in their care. For example, a Mississippi 
legislative committee report expressed concern with the state's revenue 
maximization contract, including the resulting fiscal incentives and possi-
ble negative impact on services: 
Nationally, the troubling policy issue arising with use of revenue 
maximization practices for these types of services is that an agency 
may have a greater financial interest in removing a child from a 
home if the child is eligible for federal foster care funds. Con-
versely, in trying to take full advantage of available federal funds, 
some children might not receive needed services if they do not 
qualify for federal programs.220 
Thus, the increasing use of revenue maxImIzation consultants by 
state human service agencies can divert the agencies' efforts more toward 
increasing funds rather than improving services. Although the consultants 
can in fact help bring in additional federal funds, the resulting revenue 
maximization strategies developed by the consultants often lead to the 
funds being routed into general state revenue rather than toward in-
creased funding for the agency services. The intended welfare maximiza-
tion goals are overcome by revenue maximization strategies, with the 
federal funds intended to help the vulnerable populations being diverted 
into private profits and state general revenue.221 
C. Agency Interests vs. State Interests 
Human service agencies exist as arms of the states and thus are sub-
ject to state control. As the agencies are desperately searching for addi-
tional funds, their parent states are as well. As a result, the additional 
218. Presentation on Social Security for Foster Care Children, DISABILITY ASSOCI-
ATES OF AMERICA (2007), http://myssi.uslindex.htm. 
219. Fees, DISABILITY ASSOCIATES OF AMERICA (2007), http://myssi.us/fees.htm. 
220. JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND Ex-
PENDITURE REVIEW (PEER), REPORT TO MISSISSIPPI LEGISLATURE, THE DEPART-
MENT OF HUMAN SERVICES' USE OF REVENUE MAXIMIZATION CONTRACTS 7 (Dec. 6, 
2000), available at http://www.peer.state.ms.uslreports/rpt413.pdf. 
221. Oates, supra note 202, at 350. 
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federal funds resulting from revenue maximization contracts often do not 
result in additional fiscal capacity for the human service agencies. In-
stead, through fiscal maneuvers, states convert the funds into general rev-
enue.222 The parens patriae power that is housed within state human 
services agencies-already diverted toward agency self-interest-is often 
further manipulated by the broader state powers and interests, with the 
states aiming to control their agency parts in order to serve themselves.223 
The states' financial conflict with their agencies and diversion of the 
federal funds can occur overtly. For example, New Hampshire's former 
Governor Judd Gregg created a new general revenue line item for federal 
Medicaid funds that he then diverted to general state use, which ac-
counted for 28 percent of New Hampshire's total general fund revenue in 
the first year the practice was implemented.224 
Or, the states can achieve the same result by simply reducing state 
budget allocations to its agencies in anticipation of increased federal 
funds to replace the state spending. For example, a report by the Arizona 
Office of the Auditor General describes such practice in the state's reve-
nue maximization project, including a contract with the peG to increase 
claiming of federal IV-E foster care funds: "[i]f the project results in new 
revenues or cost savings, the agency's program budget may be reduced to 
return some newly generated revenues to the General Fund."225 
Thus, children are used as a source of funds for the agencies, which 
in turn are used as a source of funds for the states, with the children's best 
interests lost in the competing fiscal shuffle. The result is a conflict be-
tween agency purpose and self-interest, between the agencies and their 
parent states, and between the states and their agencies with the federal 
government. Rather than promoting collaboration between the federal 
222. Hatcher, supra note 12, at 70S-B. 
223. [d. at 709-1S. 
224. Kevin Landrigan, Feds Might Demand $165m Payback: N.H. Official Warns 
Surplus at Risk over Medicaid "Bonus," NASHUA TELEGRAPH, Jan. 31, 2006, http:// 
www.nashuatelegraph.com/apps/pbcs.dll/ article? AlD=/2] 0060131/N E WS02/1 0131 011 
S. 
22S. STATE OF ARIZONA, OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL, REVENUE MAX-
IMIZATION, REPORT No. IB-OS02 (Dec. 200S), available at http://www.azauditor.gov/ 
Reports/State_Agencies/Agencies/Economic_Security,_DepartmenCofJPerformance/ 
IB-OS02/IB-OS02.pdf (explaining how the PCG helped the state claim more foster care 
funds, and explains that after PCG receives its contingency fees, the remaining addi-
tional funds were used to cover state budget reductions "made in anticipation of in-
creased federal revenues from this project"); see also ARIZONA, MONTHLY FISCAL 
HIGHLIGHTS (June 200S), available at http://www.azleg.gov/jlbc/mfh-jun-OS.pdf (ex-
plaining how the foster care agency budget was reduced by $1.4 million in FY 2006 "in 
anticipation of the additionallV-E revenue"). 
200 NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
and state governments, the self-interested practices-spurred on by the 
revenue maximization consultants-pit the levels of government against 
each other.226 The ideals of fiscal federalism are shredded, and children's 
interests are not served. 
IV. CONCLUSION: RETHINKING AGENCY 
PURPOSE AND POWER 
In feudal England, at a time when children were considered no 
more than property and societal burdens, the parens patriae power was 
used to assert guardianship over the children of wealthy landowners in 
order to increase riches for the crown.227 Because the ability to provide 
protective services as parens patriae was limited, the crown developed fis-
cal strategy to seek out children with revenue enhancing potential.228 Tak-
ing assets from the children of landed gentry after their parents died was 
considered the right of the crown in return for providing wardship ser-
vices.229 Thus, the purpose of parens patriae to protect the vulnerable chil-
dren in the king's realm in turn rationalized the power to assert dominion 
over the children's property and funds. 
Enlightenment and awareness led to societal revulsion that forced 
the end of such practices.230 Today, as the parens patriae doctrine has been 
brought forward to provide the inherent purpose and power of child wel-
fare agencies to serve vulnerable children, wealthy children are no longer 
targeted. But rich children have been replaced with the poor. 
As today's agency inheritors of the parens patriae obligation face 
their own search for increased revenue, they have looked back and taken 
hold of the doctrine's unfortunate beginnings. Revenue maximization 
226. CARASSO & BESS, supra note 208, at 32-33. The report explains that "From 
the federal perspective, the purpose of federal entitlement and block grant programs 
is to finance safety net provisions more adequately; the federal formulas are intended 
to give states incentives to spend more on necessary programs they would not other-
wise (fully) fund because of prohibitive cost." ld. at 32. But the states view the money 
quite differently: "From the state government perspective, revenue maximization 
often means just spending less state general revenue and more federal and local reve-
nue." Td. at 33. 
227. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text. 
228. Curtis, supra note 20, at 897-98. 
229. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text. 
230. Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EM-
ORY L.J. 195, 199 (1978) ("The historical record itself suggests that the Court of 
Wards and Liveries was in fact established with the express purpose of increasing 
revenue from sales of wardships, and that reaction to abuses in this context led to the 
eventual abolition of the court, if not the wardship institution itself."). 
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strategies concocted with private consultants again target children with 
revenue producing potential-but today's targets are the vulnerable 
rather than the entitled: children living in poverty, suffering from disabili-
ties, and with deceased or disabled parents.231 Strategies to increase the 
agency's "penetration rates" seek to increase the percentage of children 
in state care taken from poor families.232 Then, often with the assistance 
of their revenue maximization consultants, the agencies track down chil-
dren who are disabled or have deceased or disabled parents, because the 
children provide the revenue-enhancing opportunity of converting the 
children's Social Security assets into agency funds. 233 
As the targeted self-interested fiscal practices of modern agency 
owners of the parens patriae power have come to match those of their 
feudal ancestors-albeit flipped from the rich to poor-so too has the 
rationale. As the feudal crown asserted its power over children's assets as 
its prerogative for providing wardship services, today's child welfare 
agencies claim their dominion over foster children's assets as their right 
for carrying out their parens patriae obligations of providing the children 
with guardianship care.234 
In fact, today's agency practices are in many ways worse than those 
of feudal times. Whereas children born into the privileged class structure 
of the feudal tenurial system might maintain their social status and privi-
lege after reaching adulthood and no longer needing wardship care,235 
children today enter foster care poor, and leave care poor-if not worse. 
The agencies take what is often the only asset the children possess, and 
virtually abandon the children to the streets after they age out of care.236 
Well over a third of the children aging out of foster care never graduated 
from high school, only 3 percent complete college, less than half find em-
ployment, 85 percent suffer from mental health issues, over a third are 
231. Hatcher, supra note 8, at 1805-10. 
232. [d. 
233. [d. 
234. See generally Brief of Appellees, supra note 156. 
235. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text. 
236. FIRST STAR & CHILDREN'S ADVOCACY INSTITUTE, THE FLEECING OF Fos-
TER CHILDREN: How WE CONFISCATE THEIR ASSETS AND UNDERMINE THEIR FI-
NANCIAL SECURITY 2 (2011), available at http://www.caichildlaw.org/Misc/Fleecing_ 
ReporCFinal_HR.pdf ("We essentially abandon our foster youth in the wilderness 
when they age out, with no resources, no map or compass, and no one to serve as 
guide."). 
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homeless, and more than one out of every four males become 
incarcerated.237 
So as child welfare agencies have sought to turn the clock back 
thousands of years to rationalize their treatment of their child benefi-
ciaries as a source of funds, enlightenment is necessary again. Despite the 
agencies' loathing of judicial review, litigation must continue to bring the 
practices to the attention of the courts. Despite the agencies' clinging to 
confidentiality in their practices, the press must continue to make the 
public aware.238 And despite the agencies' assertion of absolute discretion 
without interference, Congress must force the agencies to only act in the 
best interests of children-if the agencies will not do so on their own 
accord.239 
In the end, it is not complicated. Agencies created with the sole pur-
pose of serving the best interests of vulnerable children should only use 
their power to serve that goal. 
237. Id. at iii; Austen L. Parrish, A voiding the Mistakes of Terrell R.: The Undoing 
of the California Tort Claims Act and the Move to Absolute Governmental Immunity 
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TIMES, Feb. 17,2006, at Al. This article tells the story of J.G., whose case is described 
above. Supra notes 169-174 and accompanying text. 
239. See FOSTER CHILDREN SELF SUPPORT ACT, H.R. 6192, 111th Congo (2010); 
see also STATEMENT OF DANIEL HATCHER, COMM. ON HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS, 
SUBCOMM. ON HUMAN RESOURCES, 2006 WL 1415161 (F.D.C.H.), May 23, 2006 (tes-
timony suggesting legislation to protect foster children's Social Security benefits from 
state agency practices that convert the funds into agency revenue). 
